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1. Introduction
In the context of missing formal insurance markets and limited access to lending and
borrowing, incomes may be smoothed through informal risk-sharing agreements that utilize
social connections. A large theoretical and empirical literature studies how well informal
arrangements replace the missing markets.1 However, the existing literature does not investi-
gate a potential downside to these agreements: if people’s network position affects the share
of surplus generated by risk sharing they appropriate, social investments may be distorted
and inequality may endogenously arise.2
Our starting premise is that social networks are endogenous and that their structure affects
how the surplus from risk sharing is split. There is growing empirical evidence that risk-
sharing networks respond to financial incentives, and that in general risk-sharing networks
form endogenously, in a way that depends on the economic environment: see for example
recent work by Binzel et al. (2017) and Banerjee et al. (2014b,c), which in different contexts
look at how social networks respond to the introduction of financial instruments such as
savings vehicles or microfinance. Our main goal is to develop a theoretical framework that
can be used to think about the endogeneity of risk sharing networks, and to aid understanding
about how these networks change after certain economic interventions, or more generally after
changes in the economic environment.
We provide an examination of these issues, by considering a simple two stage model. In the
first stage villagers invest in costly bilateral relationships (as in Myerson (1991) and Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996)), knowing that in the second stage they will reach informal risk-sharing
agreements. These agreements determine how the surplus generated by risk sharing is dis-
tributed, and they depend on the endogenous structure of the social network from the first
stage. In this way we elucidate new costs associated with informal risk-sharing. Once incomes
have been realized, risk sharing typically reduces inequality by smoothing incomes. Never-
theless, asymmetric equilibrium networks can still generate inequality in expected utilities
terms. Agents occupying more advantageous positions in the social network may appropriate
considerably more of the benefits generated by risk sharing.
For analytical tractability, in our benchmark model we impose several specific assumptions:
agents have CARA utilities, their income realizations are jointly normal, and that surplus
is negotiated according to a particular bargaining process, split-the-difference negotiations
(Stole and Zwiebel (1996)). In Section 6 we extend our main results to more general set-
tings, dropping all of the specific assumptions above, and showing that the results are robust
1An incomplete list of papers includes Rosenzweig (1988), Fafchamps (1992), Coate and Ravallion (1993),
Townsend (1994), Udry (1994), Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2002), Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), Bloch,
Genicot, and Ray (2008), Angelucci and di Giorgi (2009), Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer and Tan (2012),
Ambrus, Mobius and Szeidl (2014).
2Previous works that do consider endogenously formed networks include Bramoullé and Kranton (2007a,b)
in the theoretical literature and Attanasio et al. (2012) in the experimental literature. For a related paper
outside the networks framework, see Glaeser et al. (2002).
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to introducing features missing from the benchmark model such as imperfect risk-sharing,
enforcement constraints or the possibility of some coalitional deviations.
In the second stage of our model, pairs of agents who have formed a connection commit to a
bilateral risk-sharing agreement (transfers contingent on income realizations). We investigate
agreements satisfying two simple properties. First we require agreements to be pairwise
efficient, in that no pair of directly connected agents leave gains from trade on the table.3
Second, following Stole and Zwiebel (1996), we require the agreements to be robust to “split-
the-difference” renegotiations.4 We show that this leads to the surplus being divided by the
Myerson value,5 a network-specific version of the Shapley value.6 The transfers required to
implement the agreements we identify are particularly simple. Each agent receives an equal
share of aggregate realized income (as in Bramoullé and Kranton, 2007a) and on top of that
state independent transfers are made.7
A key implication of the Myerson value determining the division of surplus is that agents
who are more centrally located, in a certain sense, receive a higher share of the surplus. More-
over, in our risk-sharing context it implies that agents receive larger payoffs from providing
“bridging links” to otherwise socially distant agents than from providing local connections.8
Empirical evidence supports this feature of our model—see Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007),
and references therein from the organizational literature: Burt (1992), Podolny and Baron
(1997), Ahuja (2000), and Mehra et al. (2001).
Our analysis considers a community that comprises different groups where all agents within
each group are ex-ante identical, and establishing links within groups is cheaper than across
groups. We also assume that the income realizations of agents within groups are more
positively correlated than across groups. Groups can represent different ethnic groups or
castes in a given village, or different villages.
3Although we consider a model in which there is perfect bilateral risk sharing, we could easily extend the
model so that some income is perfectly observed, some income is private, and there is perfect risk sharing of
observable income and no risk sharing of unobservable income. This would be consistent with the theoretical
predictions of Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) and the empirical findings of Kinnan (2011). In the CARA
utilities setting, such unobserved income outside the scope of the risk-sharing arrangement does not affect our
results.
4Stole and Zwiebel (1996) model bargaining between many employees and an employer. This scenario can be
represented by a star network with the employer at the center. We extend their approach to general network
structures.
5For related noncooperative foundations for the Myerson value, see Fontenay and Gans (2014) and Navarro
and Perea (2013). Slikker (2007) also provides noncooperative foundations, although the game analyzed is
not decentralized: offers are made at the coalitional level.
6The Myerson value is also often assumed in social networks contexts on normative grounds, as a fair allocation:
see a related discussion on pp. 422–425 of Jackson (2010).
7For investigations of the division of surplus in social networks in other contexts, see Calvo-Armengol (2001,
2003), Corominas-Bosch (2004), Manea (2011), Kets et al. (2011) and Elliott and Nava (2016).
8More precisely, in Section 4 we introduce the concept of Myerson distance to capture the social distance
between agents in the network, and show that a pair of agents’ payoffs from forming a relationship are
increasing in this measure.
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We first consider the case of homogeneous agents, that is, when there is only one group.
Using the inclusion–exclusion principle from combinatorics,9 we develop a new metric to
describe how far apart two agents located in a network are, which we call the Myerson
distance. Using this distance we provide a complete characterization of stable networks.
We find that even when agents are ex-ante identical, efficient networks might only be stable
if they are extremely asymmetric, thereby identifying a novel trade-off between efficiency and
inequality. Among all possible efficient network structures, we find that the most stable (in
the sense of being stable for the largest set of parameter values) results in the most unequal
division of surplus (for any inequality measure in the Atkinson class). Conversely, the least
stable efficient network entails the most equal division of surplus among all efficient networks.
Although agents are ex-ante identical, efficiency considerations push the structure of social
connections towards asymmetric outcomes that elevate certain individuals. Socially central
individuals emerge endogenously from risk-sharing considerations alone. The intuition for
this result is that the star network minimizes distance between periphery agents and hence
provides the least incentives for them to establish nonessential and therefore socially inefficient
extra links.
Turning attention to the case of multiple groups, we find that across-group underinvestment
(no connection between two groups even though it would be socially efficient) becomes an
issue when the cost of maintaining links across groups is sufficiently high.10 The reason is
that the agents who establish the first connection across groups receive less than the social
surplus generated by the link, providing positive externalities for peers in their groups. To
consider which agents are best incentivised to provide across-group links we introduce a new
measure of network centrality which we term Myerson centrality. Agents more central in
this sense have better incentives to provide across-group links. This provides a second force
pushing some agents within a group to be more central than others. For example, with two
groups, we show that the most stable efficient network structure involves stars within groups,
connected by their centers. This reinforces the trade-off between efficiency and equality in
the many-groups context.
Beyond this central takeaway, our results also suggest that within homogeneous groups the
likely source of inefficiency is overinvestment, as agents might spend too much time building
social capital, in order to occupy more central positions in the network. On the other hand,
accross groups (communities) it is more likely to expect underinvestment inefficiency, as the
agents who establish the first connections do not receive the full social benefits of the link,
and they exert a positive externality to other agents in their groups. Empirical work suggests
that both these types of inefficiencies in investmenys into social capital arising in our model
are possible, in different contexts. Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) cites numerous references
from sociology and anthropology, suggesting that members of poor communities allocate
9See Chapter 10 in van Lint and Wilson (2001).
10While across-group overinvestment remains possible, the main concern when across-group link costs are
relatively high is underinvestment.
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inefficiently large amounts of time to activities maintaining social ties, instead of productive
activities. In contrast, Feigenberg et al. (2013) find evidence in a microfinance setting that it
is relatively easy to experimentally intervene and create social ties among people that yield
substantial benefits, suggesting underinvestment in social relationships.
We provide several generalizations of the model that show that the main insights from
the benchmark model are robust, and identify additional channels strengthening the results.
When bilateral transactions are costly and hence risk-sharing is imperfect, efficiency requires
shorter path-lengths between agents, adding an additional force for the emergence of central
agents with direct connections to many others in the society. When relationship may fail
such that transfers between the affected agents are not possible, redundancy needs to built
into the network and the most robust and cost-effective way to do that is to have some very
central agents. When risk-sharing agreements between two agents can only be enforced if
they have a common friend (in the spirit of Jackson et al. (2012) and Renou and Tomala
(2012)), the efficient network structure most robust to a simple form of coalitional deviations
is a star structure of triangles, with one highly connected agent in the center. We also show
that if there are some exogenously given links, like family relationships, partitioning society to
various components then the most stable efficient network will again require a star structure
of these components, with one central component connecting to all others. Finally, using the
Moore bound from graph theory, we show that there is a basic tension between efficiency and
equality/stability that does not depend on the fine details of the modeling of the economic
interactions.
Among the theoretical studies on social networks and informal risk sharing that are most
related to ours are Bramoullé and Kranton (2007a,b), Bloch et al. (2008), Jackson et al.
(2012), Billand et al. (2012), Ali and Miller (2013, 2016), Ambrus et al. (2014) and Ambrus
Gao and Milan (2016). Many of these papers focus on the enforcement issues we mainly
abstract from, and investigate how social capital can be used to sustain cooperation for
lower discount factors than would otherwise be possible. We take a complementary approach
and instead focus on the distribution of surplus and the incentives this creates for social
investments. One way of viewing our approach is an assumption on the discount factor in a
dynamic version of our model. As long as the discount factor is high enough, our equilibrium
agreements satisfy the necessary incentive compatibility constraints to be able to be enforced
in equilibrium of the dynamic game. And for a range of discount factors below this threshold,
our results on enforcement in our extensions section apply.
Among the aforementioned papers, Bramoullé and Kranton (2007a,b) and Billand et al.
(2012) investigate endogenously and costly formed networks. Bramoullé and Kranton’s
(2007a,b) model assumes that the surplus on a connected income component is equally dis-
tributed, independently of the network structure. This rules out the possibility of overinvest-
ment or inequality, and leads to different types of stable networks than in our model. Instead
of assuming optimal risk-sharing arrangements, Billand et al. (2012) assume an exogenously
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given social norm, which prescribes that high-income agents transfer a fixed amount of re-
sources to all low-income neighbors. This again leads to very different predictions regarding
the types of networks that form in equilibrium.
More generally, understanding the structure of endogenously formed networks is impor-
tant. Establishing and maintaining social connections (relationships) is costly, in terms of
time and other resources. However, on top of direct consumption utility, such links can yield
many economic benefits. Papers studying the structure of formed networks in different con-
texts include Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Bala and Goyal (2000), Kranton and Minehart
(2001), Hojman and Szeidl (2008), and Elliott (2015). Although we study a specific problem
tailored to risk sharing in villages, the general structure of our problem is relevant to other
applications.11
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes risk sharing on
a fixed network. In Section 3 we introduce a game of network formation with costly link
formation. We focus on the structure of networks formed within a single group in Section
4 and then turn to networks spanning multiple groups in Section 5. Section 6 provides
generalizations and extensions of our benchmark model, while Section 7 concludes.
2. Preliminaries and Risk Sharing on a Fixed Network
To study social investments and the structure of formed networks, first we need to specify
what risk-sharing arrangements take place once the network is formed. Below we introduce
an economy in which agents face random income realizations, introduce some basic network
terminology, and discuss risk-sharing arrangements for a given network.
2.1. The socio-economic environment. We denote the set of agents in our model by N,
and assume that they are partitioned into a set of groups M. We let G : N → M be a
function that assigns each agent to a group; i.e., if G(i) = g then agent i is in group g. One
interpretation of the group partitioning is that N represents individuals in a region (such as
a district or subdistrict), and groups correspond to different villages in the region. Another
possible interpretation is that N represents individuals in a village, and the groups correspond
to different castes.
Agents in N face uncertain income realizations, with expected value µ and variance σ2
for each agent. We assume that the correlation coefficient between the incomes of any two
agents within the same group is ρw, while between the incomes of any two agents not in the
same group it is ρa < ρw.
12 That is, we assume that incomes are more positively correlated
11For a different and more specific application, suppose researchers can collaborate on a project. Each re-
searcher brings something heterogenous and positive to the value of the collaboration, so that the value of
the collaboration is increasing in the set of agents involved. Collaboration is possible only when it takes place
among agents who are directly connected to another collaborator and surplus is split according to the Myerson
value (as in our work, motivated by robustness to renegotiations). Such a setting fits into our framework.
12It is well-known that for a vector of random variables, not all combinations of correlations are possible. We
implicitly assume that our parameters are such that the resulting correlation matrix is positive semidefinite.
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within groups than across groups, so that all else equal, social connections across groups have
a higher potential for risk sharing.
Although we introduce the possibility of correlated incomes in a fairly stylized way, our
paper is one of the first to permit differently correlated incomes between different pairs of
agents. Such correlations are central to the effectiveness of risk-sharing arrangements, as
shown below.
We refer to possible realizations of the vector of incomes as states, and denote a generic
state by ω. We let yi(ω) denote the income realization of agent i in state ω. Agents can
redistribute realized incomes; hence their consumption levels can differ from their realized
incomes.
In our benchmark model we make a number of simplifying assumptions. First, we assume
that all agents have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility functions:




where ci is agent i’s consumption and λ > 0 is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
Second, we assume that incomes are jointly normally distributed.13 The assumption of CARA
utilities, together with jointly normally distributed incomes, greatly enhances the tractability
of our model: as we show below it leads to a transferable utility environment in which the
implemented risk-sharing arrangements are relatively simple. This utility formulation can be
considered a theoretical benchmark case with no income effects. We generalize the theory
relaxing these and other assumptions in Section 6.
2.2. Basic network terminology. Before proceeding, we introduce some standard termi-
nology from network theory. A social network L is an undirected network, with nodes N
corresponding to the different agents, and links representing social connections. Abusing no-
tation we also let L denote the set of links in the network. We will refer to the agents linked
to agent i, N(i;L) := {j : lij ∈ L} ⊂ N, as i’s neighbors. Where there should be no confusion
we abuse notation by writing N(i) instead of N(i;L). The degree centrality of an agent is
simply the number of neighbors she has (i.e., the cardinality of N(i;L)). An agent’s neighbors
can be partitioned according to the groups they belong to. Let Ng(i;L) be i’s neighbors on
network L from group g. A walk is a sequence of different agents {i, k, k′, . . . , k′′, j} such that
every pair of adjacent agents in the sequence is linked. A path is a walk in which all agents
are different. The path length of a path is the number of agents in the path.
We will sometimes refer to subsets of agents S ⊆ N and denote the subnetworks they
generate by L(S) := {lij ∈ L : i, j ∈ S}. A subset of agents S ⊆ N is path-connected on L
if, for each i ∈ S and each j ∈ S, there exists a path connecting i and j. For any network
there is a unique partition of N such that there are no links between agents in different
13This specification implies that we cannot impose a lower bound on the set of feasible consumption levels.
As we show below, our framework readily generalizes to arbitrary income distributions, but the assumption
of normally distributed shocks simplifies the analysis considerably.
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partition elements but all agents within a partition element are path-connected. We refer to
these partition elements as network components. A shortest path between two path-connected
agents i and j is a path connecting i and j with a lower path length than any other. The
diameter of a network component C ⊂ L is d(C), the maximum value—taken over all pairs
of agents in C—of the length of a shortest path. A network component is a tree when there
is a unique path between any two agents in the component. A line network is the unique
(tree) network, up to a relabeling of agents, in which there is a path from one (end) agent to
the other (end) agent that passes through all other agents. A star network is the unique tree
network, up to a relabeling of agents, in which one (center) agent is connected to all other
agents.
2.3. Risk-Sharing Agreements. In our benchmark model we assume that income can be
directly shared between agents i, j ∈ N if and only if they are connected, i.e., lij ∈ L.14
We let agents’ income realizations be publicly observed within their network component,
so agents can make transfer arrangements contingent on it. We consider this environment
with perfectly observable incomes within a component as a benchmark which is a relatively
good description of village societies in which people closely monitor each other. It is also
straightforward to extend the model so that some income is publicly observed (and shared)
while the remaining income is privately observed (and never shared). Results are very similar
for this more general setting.15
Formally, a risk-sharing agreement on a network L specifies transfer tij(ω,L) = −tji(ω,L)
between neighboring agents i and j for every possible state ω. Abusing notation where there
should be no confusion we sometimes drop the second argument and write tij(ω) instead of
tij(ω,L). The interpretation is that in state ω agent i is supposed to transfer tij(ω) units of
consumption to agent j if tij(ω) > 0, and receives this amount from agent j if tij(ω) < 0.
Given a transfer arrangement between neighboring agents, agent i’s consumption in state
ω is ci(ω) = yi(ω) −
∑
j∈N(i) tij(ω). It is straightforward to show that state-contingent
consumption plans (ci(·))i∈N are feasible, that is they can be achieved by bilateral trans-
fers between neighboring agents, if and only if for each component C, containing agents S,∑
i∈S ci(ω) =
∑
i∈S yi(ω) for every state ω.
A basic assumption we make in our model is that given all other risk-sharing arrangements,
an agreement reached by linked agents i and j must leave no gains from trade on the table.
14In Section 6, motivated by the literature on self-enforcing risk-sharing agreements, we relax this assumption
and instead consider the possibility that a link can be used for risk-sharing if and only if it is supported (i.e.,
the two individuals have a friend in common).
15Kinnan (2011) finds evidence that hidden income can explain imperfect risk sharing in Thai villages relative
to the enforceability and moral hazard problems we are abstracting from. Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) show
that when individuals can privately store income, state-contingent transfers are not possible and risk sharing
is limited to borrowing and lending.
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There must be no other agreement that can make both i and j strictly better off holding
fixed the agreements of other players. We call such transfers pairwise efficient.16
By the well-known Borch rule (see Borch (1962), Wilson (1968)) a necessary and sufficient



















for every pair of states ω and ω′. But if this holds for all neighboring agents i and j then
the same condition must hold for all pairs of agents on a component of L, independently
of whether they are directly or indirectly connected. Hence, pairwise-efficient risk-sharing
arrangements are equivalent to Pareto-efficient agreements at the component level. For this
reason, below we establish some important properties of Pareto-efficient risk-sharing arrange-
ments on components.
Proposition 1 shows that the CARA utilities framework has the convenient property that
expected utilities are transferable, in the sense defined by Bergstrom and Varian (1985). This
can be used to show that ex-ante Pareto efficiency is equivalent to minimizing the sum of the
variances, and it is achieved by agreements that in every state split the sum of the incomes
on each network component equally among the members and then adjust these shares by
state-independent transfers. The latter determine the division of the surplus created by the
risk sharing agreement. We emphasize that this result does not require any assumption on
the distribution of incomes, only that agents have CARA utilities.
Proposition 1. For CARA utility functions certainty-equivalent units of consumption are
transferable across agents, and if L(S) is a network component, the Pareto frontier of ex-
ante risk-sharing agreements among agents in S is represented by a simplex in the space of
certainty-equivalent consumption. The ex-ante Pareto-efficient risk-sharing agreements for










yi(ω) for every state ω,






yk(ω) + τi for every i ∈ S and state ω,




The proof of Proposition 1 is in Appendix I. Proposition 1 implies that the total sur-
plus generated by efficient risk-sharing arrangements is an increasing function of the re-
duction in aggregate consumption variance (the sum of consumption variances). For a
general distribution of shocks, this function can be complicated. However, if shocks are
16More formally, transfers {tij(ω,L)}ω∈Ω, ij:lij∈L are pairwise efficient for a network L if there is no pair of
agents ij : lij ∈ L and no alternative transfers {t′ij(ω,L)}ω∈Ω, ij:lij∈L such that t
′
kl(ω,L) = tkl(ω,L) for all
kl 6= ij and all ω ∈ Ω, that gives both i and j strictly higher expected utility.
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k∈S yk + τi is also normally distributed, and
E(v(ci)) = E(ci) − λ2 Var(ci).
17 Hence in this case the total social surplus generated by
efficient risk-sharing agreements is proportional to the aggregate consumption variance re-
duction. This greatly simplifies the computation of surpluses in the analysis below.
We use TS(L) to denote the expected total surplus generated by an ex-ante Pareto-efficient






where, for L′ ⊂ L, ∆ Var(L,L′) is the additional variance reduction obtained by efficient
risk-sharing on network L instead of L′, and CE(·) denotes the certainty-equivalent value of
a variance reduction.
For a network L, consisting of a single component, if all agents are from the same group
then as there are CARA utility functions and normally distributed incomes













(n− 1)σ2(1− ρw) = (n− 1)V,
where V := λ2σ
2(1− ρw).
2.4. Division of Surplus. The assumption that neighboring agents make pairwise-efficient
risk-sharing agreements pins down agreements up to state-independent transfers between
neighboring agents, but does not constrain the latter transfers (hence the division of surplus)
in any way. In our benchmark model, to determine these transfers, we follow the approach
in Stole and Zwiebel (1996) and require that agreements are robust to split-the-difference
renegotiations. This implies that the transfer is set in a way such that the incremental benefit
that the link provides to the two agents is split equally between them. This can be interpreted
as a social norm. For a detailed motivation of this assumption, and for noncooperative
microfoundations, see Stole and Zwiebel (1996) and Brügemann et al. (2018a). In Section 6
we consider a much larger set of risk-sharing agreements and show that our main results still
hold.
Splitting the incremental benefits of a risk sharing link equally between two agents requires
calculating the expected payoffs i and j would receive if they did not have an agreement. We
therefore have to consider what agreements would prevail on the network without lij to find
the risk sharing agreements i and j can reach on L, and so on. This results in a recursive
system of conditions.
More formally, for a network L a contingent transfer scheme
(5) T (L) := {tij(ω,L′)}ω∈Ω, L′⊆L, ij:lij∈L,
specifies all transfers made in all subnetworks of L in all states of the world. The expected
utility of agent i on a network L′ ⊆ L given a contingent transfer scheme T (L) is denoted
17See, for example, Arrow (1965).
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1 3 4 2 
𝑁𝑇𝑆 = 3𝑉 
(a) Line network
2 4 3 
𝑁𝑇𝑆 = 2𝑉 
(b) Three nodes
4 3 
𝑁𝑇𝑆 = 𝑉 
(c) Two nodes
Figure 1. To find (gross) expected utilities that are robust to split-the-
difference renegotiations on the (formed) line network shown we need to con-
sider the expected utilities that would be obtained on all subnetworks.
ui(L
′, T (L)). Where there should be no confusion, we will abuse notation and drop the
second argument.
For any network L, the expected utility vector (u1, ..., u|N|) is robust to split-the-difference
renegotiation if there is a contingent transfer scheme T (L) such that ui = ui(L, T (L)) for
every i ∈ N and the following conditions hold:
(i) ui(L
′)− ui(L′ \ {lij}) = uj(L′)− uj(L′ \ {lij}) for every lij ∈ L′ and L′ ⊆ L;
(ii) transfers {tij(ω,L′)}ω∈Ω, ij:lij∈L′ are pairwise efficient for all L′ ⊆ L.
Suppose all agents are from the same group, we have CARA utilities, incomes are normally
distributed and we want to find payoffs robust to split-the-difference renegotiation for the line
network shown in Figure 1a. A first necessary condition is that agents 1 and 2 benefit equally
from their link so that u1(L)− u1(L \ {l12}) = u2(L)− u2(L \ {l12}). But in order to ensure
this condition is satisfied, we need to know u1(L \ {l12}) and u2(L \ {l12}). Normalizing the
autarky utility of all agents to 0, without the link l12 agent 1 is isolated so u1(L \ {l12}) =
0. However, to find u2(L \ {l12}) we need to find payoffs for the three node network in
Figure 1b. For this network robustness to split-the-difference renegotiation requires that
u2(L\{l12})−u2(L\{l12, l23}) = u3(L\{l12})−u3(L\{l12, l23}). While u2(L\{l23, l23, }) = 0,
we need to consider the two node network shown in Figure 1c to find u3(L \ {l12, l23}). For
this network, payoffs must satisfy u3(L\{l12, l23})−u3(L\{l12, l23, l34}) = u4(L\{l12, l23})−
u4(L \ {l12, l23, l34}). As u3(L \ {l12, l23, l34}) = u4(L \ {l12, l23, l34}) = 0, the above condition
simplifies to u3(L \ {l12, l23}) = u4(L \ {l12, l23}) = V/2, where the last equality follows from
pairwise efficiency. Considering the three node network again, we now have the condition
u2(L \ {l12}) = u3(L \ {l12}) − V/2. As the link l23 generates an incremental surplus of V
to be split between agents 2 and 3, pairwise efficiency implies that u2(L \ {l12}) = V/2 and
u3(L \ {l12}) = V . Finally, returning to the line network, we now have u1(L) = u2(L)− V/2.
As the link l12 generates incremental surplus of V , u1(L) = V/2 and u2(L) = V .
18
18This argument only outlines why the payoffs u1(L) = V/2 and u2(L) = V are necessary for robustness to
split-the-difference renegotiations. By considering all other subnetworks, it can be shown that the payoffs
u1(L) = u4(L) = V/2 and u2(L) = u3(L) = V are the unique payoffs that are robust to split-the-difference
renegotiations.
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Below we show that the requirement of robustness to split-the-difference renegotiation
implies that the total surplus created by the risk-sharing agreement is divided among agents
according to the Myerson value (Myerson 1977, 1980). The Myerson value is a cooperative
solution concept defined in transferable utility environments that is a network-specific version
of the Shapley value. The basic idea behind it is the same as for the Shapley value.19 For
any order of arrivals of the players, the incremental contribution of an agent i to the total
surplus can be derived as the difference between the total surpluses generated by subnetwork
L(S) and subnetwork L(S \ {i}) if agents S \ {i} arrive before i. It is easy to see that, for
any arrival order, the total surplus generated by L gets exactly allocated to the set of all
agents. The Myerson value then allocates the average incremental contribution of a player
to the total surplus, taken over all possible orders of arrivals (permutations) of the players,




(|S| − 1)!(|N| − |S|)!
|N|!
(
TS(L(S))− TS(L(S \ {i}))
)
.
Proposition 2. For any network L, any risk-sharing agreement that is robust to split-
the-difference renegotiation yields expected payoffs to agents equal to their Myerson values:
ui(L) = MVi(L).
Proof. Theorem 1 of Myerson (1980) states that there is a unique rule for allocating surplus
for all subnetworks of L that satisfies the requirements of efficiency at the component level
(note that this is an implicit requirement in Myerson’s definition of an allocation rule) and,
what Myerson (1980) defines as the equal-gains principle. Moreover, the expected payoff the
above rule allocates to any player i is MVi. Requirement (i) in our definition of robustness
to split-the-difference renegotiation is equivalent to the equal-gains principle as defined in
Myerson (1980). Theorem 1 of Wilson (1968) implies that efficiency at the component level
is equivalent to pairwise efficiency between neighboring agents, which is requirement (ii)
in our definition of robustness to split-the-difference renegotiation. The result then follows
immediately from Theorem 1 of Myerson (1980). 
Proposition 2 is a direct implication of Myerson’s axiomatization of the value. A special
case of Proposition 2 is Theorem 1 of Stole and Zwiebel (1996), which in effect restricts
19We therefore follow Hart and Moore (1990), among others, in using the Shapley value to study investment
decisions.
20Our assumption that there is perfect risk sharing among path-connected agents ensures that a coalition of
path-connected agents generates the same surplus regardless of the exact network structure connecting them.
This means that we are in the communication game world originally envisaged by Myerson. We do not require
the generalization of the Myerson value to network games proposed in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), which
somewhat confusingly is also commonly referred to as the Myerson value. See Ambrus et al. (2016) for a
model of informal risk-sharing in which the exact shape of the network matters in terms of the surplus that
agents can attain.
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attention to a star network.21 Our contribution is to point out that their connection between
robustness to split-the-difference renegotiations and the Shapley value can be extended to
apply to all networks.22
The above result shows that any decentralized negotiation procedure between neighboring
agents that satisfies two natural properties (not leaving surplus on the table, and robustness
to split-the-difference negotiations) leads to the total surplus created by risk-sharing divided
according to the Myerson value, and to state-independent transfers between neighboring
agents that implement this surplus division. Hence, from now on we assume that all agents
expect the surplus to be divided according to the Myerson value implied by the network that
eventually forms.
Although we followed a decentralized approach to get to the implication that surplus is
divided by the Myerson value, we note that on normative grounds such a division is also cogent
in contexts in which there is a centralized community level negotiation over the division of
surplus. This is because the Myerson value is a formal way of defining the fair share of an
individual from the social surplus, as his average incremental contribution to the total social
surplus (where the average is taken across all possible orders of arrival of different players,
in the spirit of the Shapley value).
3. Investing in Social Relationships—Benchmark Case
Having defined how formed networks map into risk-sharing arrangements, we can now
consider agents’ incentives to make investments into social capital, which we think of as the
set of relationships that enable risk sharing. We begin by providing the overall framework for
the analysis. Then we look at a special case of our model, in which there is a single group.
Building on these results we then consider the multiple group case.
In this section we formalize a game of network formation in which establishing links is
costly, define efficient networks and identify different types of investment inefficiency.
We consider a two-period model in which in period 1 all agents simultaneously choose
which other agents they would like to form links with, and in period 2 agents agree upon
the ex-ante Pareto-efficient risk-sharing agreement specified in the previous section (i.e., the
total surplus from risk sharing is distributed according to the Myerson value), for the network
formed in the first period.23
Implicit in our formulation of the timing of the game is the view that relationships are
formed over a longer time horizon than that in which agreements are reached about risk
21Relative to Myerson’s axiomatization, Stole and Zwiebel (1996) generate the key system of equations through
considering robustness to renegotiations as we describe above, while Myerson wrote down the system of equa-
tions based only on fairness considerations. Stole and Zwiebel (1996) also provide non-cooperative bargaining
foundations that underpin this system.
22Brügemann et al. (2018b) undertake a related exercise regarding the non-cooperative result in Stole and
Zwiebel (1996)
23For a complementary treatment of endogenously formed networks when surplus is split according to the
Myerson value, see Pin (2011).
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sharing. By the time such agreements are being negotiated, the network structure is fixed,
and investments into forming social relationships are sunk. In addition, as mentioned in the
introduction, the second stage agreements can be viewed as a reduced form treatment of a
dynamic game with many state realizations—as long as the discount factor is high enough,
our agreements will satisfy the required incentive compatibility constraints for an equilibrium.
We also relax our assumptions on enforcement in Section 6.
In period 1 the solution concept we apply to identify which networks form is pairwise
stability. The collection of links formed is social network L, and agent i pays a cost κw > 0
for each link i has to someone in the same group, and κa > κw for each links i has to someone
from a different group. Normalizing the utility from autarky to 0, we abuse notation24 and
let agent i’s net expected utility if network L forms be





A network L is pairwise stable with respect to expected utilities {ui(L)}i∈N if and only if
for all i, j ∈ N, (i) if lij ∈ L then ui(L)− ui(L \ {lij}) ≥ 0 and uj(L)− uj(L \ {lij}) ≥ 0; and
(ii) if lij /∈ L then ui(L ∪ lij)− ui(L) > 0 implies uj(L ∪ lij)− uj(L) < 0. In words, pairwise
stability requires that no two players can both strictly benefit by establishing an extra link
with each other, and no player can benefit by unilaterally deleting one of his links. From now
on we will use the terms pairwise-stable and stable interchangeably.
Existence of a pairwise-stable network in our model follows from a result in Jackson (2003),
stating that whenever payoffs in a simultaneous-move network formation game are determined
based on the Myerson value, there exists a pairwise-stable network.
Our specification assumes that two agents forming a link have to pay the same cost for
establishing the link. However, the set of stable networks would remain unchanged if we
allowed the agents to share the total costs of establishing a link arbitrarily.25 This is because
for any link, the Myerson value rewards the two agents establishing the link symmetrically.
Hence the agents can find a split of the link-formation cost such that establishing the link
is profitable for both of them if and only if it is profitable for both of them to form the link
with an equal split of the cost. Given this we stick with the simpler model with exogenously
given costs.
A network L is efficient when there is no other network L′—and no risk sharing agreement
on L′—that can make everyone at least as well off as they were on L and someone strictly
better off. Let |Lw| be the number of within-group links, and let |La| be the number of
24In the previous section when investments had already been sunk we used ui(L) to denote i’s expected payoff
before link formation costs.
25More precisely, we could allow agents to propose a division of the costs of establishing each link as well as
indicating who they would like to link to, and a link would then form only if both agents indicate each other
and they propose the same split of the cost. A network would then be stable if it is a Nash equilibrium of this
expanded network formation game and if there is no new link lij 6∈ L , and some split of the cost of forming
this link, that would make both i and j strictly better off if formed.
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across-group links. As expected utility is transferable in certainty-equivalent units, efficient
networks must maximize the net total surplus NTS(L):
NTS(L) := TS(L)− 2|Lw|κw − 2|La|κa,(8)
Clearly, two necessary conditions for a network to be efficient are that the removal of a
set of links does not increase NTS(L) and the addition of a set of links does not increase
NTS(L). If there exists a set of links the removal of which increases NTS(L), we will
say there is overinvestment inefficiency. If there exists a set of links the addition of which
increases NTS(L), we will say there is underinvestment inefficiency.26 A network is robust to
underinvestment if there is no underinvestment inefficiency and no agent can strictly benefit
from deleting a link that would result in underinvestment inefficiency. A network is robust
to overinvestment if there is no overinvestment inefficiency and no pair of agent i, j can both
strictly benefit from creating the link lij .
We will say that a link lij is essential if after its removal i and j are no longer path-
connected while it is superfluous if after its removal i and j are still path-connected.
Remark 3. Preventing overinvestment requires that all links be essential. Superfluous links
create no social surplus and are costly. In all efficient networks, therefore, every component
must be a tree.
Real world networks among villagers are a long way from being trees. If our model perfectly
captured network formation Remark 3 would imply that there is substantial overinvestment.
However, our model is stylized, and this result needs to be applied with caution. For example,
while there may be overinvestment, our assumption that all links are costly to form is unlikely
to hold. Family ties or the time villagers spend working together might permit relationships
to be formed without any additional investment. We discuss in Section 6.4 how, what we
view as the main insights of our results, extend to a setting in which some links are free to
form.
In most of the analysis below, we focus on investigating the relationship between stable
networks and efficient networks. Additionally, we investigate the amount of inequality pre-
vailing in equilibria in our model. For this, we will use the Atkinson class of inequality
measures (Atkinson, 1970). Specifically we consider a welfare function W : R|N| → R that
maps a profile of expected utilities into the real line such that




where f(·) is assumed to be an increasing, strictly concave and differentiable function. The
concavity of f(·) captures the social planner’s preference for more equal income distributions.
26Note that these definitions are not mutually exclusive (there can be both underinvestment and overin-
vestment inefficiency) or collectively exhaustive (inefficient networks can have neither underinvestment nor
overinvestment inefficiency if an increase in the net total surplus is only possible by the simultaneous addition
and removal of links).
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Supposing all agents instead received the same expected utility u′, we can pose the question
what aggregate expected utility is required to keep the level of the welfare function constant.27
In other words we find the scalar u′ : |N|f(u′) =
∑
i∈N f(ui). Letting u = (1/|N|)
∑
i∈N ui
be the mean expected utility, Atkinson’s inequality measure (or index) is given by




We let I be the set (class) of Atkinson inequality measures and note that any I(f) ∈ I
equals zero if and only if all agents receive the same expected utility.28 There is an infinite
set of inequality measures in the Atkinson class, and two different inequality measures in
the class can rank the inequality of two distributions differently. However, there are certain
pairs of distributions are ranked the same way by all members of the class, such as when one
distribution is a mean-preserving spread of the other one.
4. Within-Group Networks
In this section we assume that |M| = 1, that is, that agents are ex-ante symmetric, and
any differences in their outcomes stem from their stable positions on the social network. This
will lay the foundations for the more general case considered in the next section.
We begin our investigation by proving a general characterization of the set of stable net-
works. Recall that a path between i and j is a walk in which no agent is visited more
than once. If there are K paths between i and j on the network L, we let P(i, j, L) =
{P1(i, j, L), . . . , PK(i, j, L)} be the set of these paths. For every k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, let |Pk(i, j, L)|
be the cardinality of the set of agents on the path Pk(i, j, L).
29 We can now use these defini-
tions to define a quantity that captures how far away two agents are on a network in terms
of the probability that for a random arrival order they will be connected without a direct
link when the second of the two agents arrives. We will refer to this distance as the agents’
Myerson distance:











|Pi1 ∪ · · · ∪ Pik |
) .
This expression calculates the probability that for a random arrival order the link lij will
be essential immediately after i arrives,30 using the classic inclusion–exclusion principle from
combinatorics. This probability is important because it affects i’s incentives to link to j.
27This exercise is analogous to the certainty equivalent exercise that can be undertaken for an agent facing
stochastic consumption.
28As f(·) approaches the linear function the social planner cares less about inequality and I(f) → 0. Never-
theless, strict concavity prevents I(f) equaling 0 unless all agents receive the same expected utility.
29For example, for a path Pk(i, j, L) = {i, i′, i′′, j}, |Pk(i, j, L)| = 4 and for a path Pk′(i, j, L) = {i, i′, i′′′, i′′′′, j},
|Pk′(i, j, L)| = 5. Finally, we will let |Pk(i, j, L) ∪ Pk′(i, j, L)| = 5 denote number of different agents on path
Pk(i, j, L) or path Pk′(i, j, L).
30If for a given arrival order, agents S ⊆ N arrive before i, then lij is essential immediately after i arrives if
it is essential on the network L(S ∪ {i}).
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As an illustration, consider the network shown in Panel (A) of Figure 2. The Myerson value
allocates each agent their average marginal contribution to total surplus, where the average
is taken over all possible arrival orders. For example, for the network shown in Figure 2
consider the arrival order 1, 2, 5, 6, 3, 4. When agent 1 is added there are no other agents and
so no links are formed. Thus 1’s marginal contribution to total surplus is 0. Then agent 2 is
added and the link l12 is formed. This link is essential on this network permitting risk sharing
between agents 1 and 2 that wasn’t previously possible. As a result, by equation 4, the total
surplus generated by risk sharing increases from 0 to V . Thus 2’s marginal contribution to
total surplus, for this arrival order, is V . When 5 and 6 are added no new links are formed
and no additional risk sharing is possible—their marginal contributions are 0. However, the
arrival of 3 results in the formation of the links l23, l35 and l36. All of these links are essential
and risk sharing among agents 1, 2, 5, 6 and 3 becomes possible. This increases total surplus
to 4V by equation 4, so 3’s marginal contribution to total surplus is 3V . Finally, adding 4
the links l14 and l45 are formed, and this permits risk sharing to also include 4 increasing













Figure 2. Paths connecting nodes 1 and 6.
Whenever a link is formed that is essential for a given arrival order, it contributes V
to total surplus, while whenever a link is superfluous for a given arrival order, it makes a
marginal contribution of 0 to total surplus.31 Consider now the incentives agent 1 has to
form a superfluous link to agent 6. To calculate this we need to know the probability with
which such a link would be essential for a random arrival order. There are three ways in
which the link l16 might not be essential upon i’s arrival. First, with probability 1/2 agent
6 arrives after agent 1 and the link l16 will be formed on 6’s arrival instead of 1’s. Second,
Path 1 shown in Panel (B) of Figure 2 might be present. This will be the case if and only
if agents 2, 3 and 6 arrive before agent 1. The probability that agent 1 is last to arrive of
these 4 agents is 1/4. Finally, Path 2 shown in Panel (C) of Figure 2 might be present. This
occurs if and only if agents 3, 4 ,5 and 6 arrive before 1. The probability that 1 is last to
arrive of these 5 agents is 1/5.
If these three possibilities were mutually exclusive, then the probability the link l16 would
be formed and essential upon 1’s arrival would be: 1− 1/2− 1/4− 1/5. The probability that
31Note that in the arrival order considered in the preceding paragraph, 4’s marginal contribution to total
surplus would still have been V without the link l14 (l45) as long as the link l45 (l14) was still formed.
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agent 6 arrives after agent 1 is mutually exclusive from the probability that either Path 1 or
Path 2 is present, because both these paths need agent 6 to arrive before agent 1. However,
it is possible for both Path 1 and Path 2 to be formed upon 1’s arrival. Indeed, this occurs
if and only if agent 1 is the last agent to arrive, which happens with probability 1/6. So
the probability that at least one of the two paths to agent 6 is present upon 1’s arrival is
1/4 + 1/5− 1/6. We need to subtract the probability 1/6 to avoid double counting the event
that both paths are present. Thus, the probability that the link l16 will be essential upon 1’s
arrival, is 1− 1/2− 1/4− 1/5 + 1/6 = md(1, 6, L).
Lemma 4. If all agents are from the same group network L is pairwise stable if and only if
(i) md(i, j, L \ {lij}) ≥ κw/V for all lij ∈ L, and
(ii) md(i, j, L) ≤ κw/V for all lij 6∈ L.
The proof is relegated to Appendix I. Recall from equation 3 that the social benefits of
a link is proportional to the variance reduction it generates. For a single group, if a link lij
is essential in the network L ∪ {lij}, then this variance reduction is ∆ Var(L ∪ {lij}, L) =
(1− ρw)σ2.
The crucial feature of this expression is that it does not depend on size of the network
components the link lij connects on L. Although in general the size of these components does
affect the consumption variance, two effects exactly offset each other.32 On the one hand,
in larger components there are more people to benefit from the essential link. On the other
hand, people are already able to smooth there consumption more effectively.
As the social value of a non-essential, or superfluous link, is always zero the total surplus
generated by a network L takes a very simple form. Let Υ(L) be the number of network
components on L. Then

















Since the surplus created by any essential link is V , the total gross surplus is equal to this
constant times the number of network component reductions obtained relative to the empty
network.
To consider individual incentives to form links we can use the definition of the Myerson
value and consider the average marginal contribution an agent makes to total surplus over
all possible arrival orders. Specifically, we want to consider the increase in i’s Myerson value
due to a link lij . The link lij will reduce the number of components in the network by one
when i arrives, relative to the counterfactual component reduction without lij , if and only
if j has already arrived and there is no other path between i and j. In other words, the
32Let L(S1) and L(S2) be the network components of agent i and agent j on network L \ {lij}, and let
|S1| = s1 and |S2| = s2. Then the sum of consumption variances on L(S1) and L(S2) (with Pareto efficient




σ2, respectively. Once S1 and S2 are connected through
lij , the sum of consumption variances on L(S1 ∪ S2) becomes s1+s2+(s1+s2)(s1+s2−1)ρws1+s2 σ
2. This implies that
the consumption variance reduction induced by the link lij is ∆ Var(L ∪ {lij}, L) = (1− ρw)σ2.
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link increases i’s marginal contribution to total surplus if and only if it is essential when
i is added. Moreover, for the permutations in which lij is essential it contributes V to i’s
marginal contribution to total surplus. Averaging over arrival order, the value to i of the link
lij ∈ L is md(i, j, L\{lij})V , while the value to establishing a new link lij 6∈ L is md(i, j, L)V .
If a link lij is essential on L then for any arrival order, there will always be a component
reduction of 1 when the later of i or j is added. Therefore, md(i, j, L) = 1/2, and lij will be
formed as long as V > 2κw. As V is the social value of forming the link and 2κw is the total
cost of forming it, when all agents are from the same group there is never underinvestment
in a stable network or overinvestment in an essential link.
Proposition 5. If all agents are from the same group then there is never underinvestment
in a stable network. Furthermore, there is never overinvestment in an essential link.
The proof is relegated to Appendix I. When all agents are from the same group Proposition
5 establishes that there is never overinvestment in an essential link, but overinvestment in
superfluous links is possible. If the costs of link formation are low enough then agents will
receive sufficient benefits from establishing superfluous links to be incentivized to do so. Even
if a link lij is superfluous on L, for some arrival orders it will be essential on the induced
subnetwork at the moment when i is added and make a positive marginal contribution to total
surplus.33 An example of such overinvestment is shown in Section E of the Supplementary
Appendix.
An immediate implication of Proposition 5 is that if all agents are from the same group
and 2κw > V then the only stable network is the empty one and this network is efficient,
while if 2κw < V then all stable networks have only one network component (all agents are
path-connected). For the remainder of the paper we focus on the parameter range for which
the empty network is inefficient for a single group and assume 2κw < V . We refer to this as
our regularity condition and omit it from the statement of subsequent results.
Under this regularity condition the set of efficient networks are the set of tree networks
in which all agents are path-connected. In other words, all agents must be in the same
component and all links must be essential. We will now focus on which, if any, of these
efficient networks are stable. As agents are well incentivized to form essential links, the only
reason an efficient network will not be stable is if two agents have a profitable deviation by
forming an additional (superfluous) link.
Figure 3 illustrates three networks: A line (Figure 3a); a circle (Figure 3b) and a star
(Figure 3c). While the line and star networks are efficient, the circle network is not as it
includes a superfluous link. Among the two efficient networks, the star is more stable than
the line. Applying Lemma 4, whenever the line is stable so is the star but there are parameter
values for which the star is stable and the line is not. While the star is more stable than
the line, it also results in more inequality. The expected utility distribution obtained on the
33Consider, for examples, arrival orders in which i arrives first and j arrives second.
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Figure 3. Three possible network structures for connecting 4 agents and the
resulting net payoffs.
line network can be generated from that obtained on the star network by the best off agent
(agent 2) transferring (V −2κw)/2 > 0 units of expected utility to one of the worst off agents
(agent 3). This is enough to ensure that the expected utility distribution on the star is more
unequal than the expected utility distribution on the line for any inequality measure in the
Atkinson class. We generalize these insights in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. Suppose all agents are from the same group.
(i) If there exists an efficient stable network then star networks are stable, and for a
non-empty range of parameter specifications only star networks are stable. If a line
network is stable then all efficient networks are stable.
(ii) For all inequality measures in the Atkinson class, among the set of efficient network,
star networks and only star networks maximize inequality, while line networks and
only line networks minimize inequality.
The proof is in Appendix I but we provide some intuition after we discuss the result.
Proposition 6 states that, in a certain sense, among the set of efficient networks the star is the
most stable but maximizes inequality, while the line minimizes inequality but is least stable.
This indicates a novel tension between stability/efficiency and inequality. For example, in
contrast, Pycia (2012) studies when stable coalitional structures exist and finds that stable
coalitions are more likely to exist when the bargaining functions of agents are more equal.
To gain intuition for Proposition 6, recall that an efficient network will be stable if and
only if no pair of players have a profitable deviation in which they form a superfluous link.
By Lemma 4 the incentives for two agents to form such a link are strictly increasing in their
Myerson distance. Thus, a network is stable if and only if the pair of agents furthest apart
from each other, in terms of their Myerson distance, cannot benefit from forming a link. As
efficient networks are tree networks, the Myerson distance between any two agents depends
only the length of the unique path between them.34 The longest path between any pair of
agents is, by definition, the diameter of the network d(L). So, an efficient network is stable if
34Suppose d is the number of agents on the unique path connecting i and j. The probability that this path
exists when agent i arrives is 1/d. In addition, if agent j has not yet arrived, which occurs with probability
1/2, i would not benefit from the link lij , so i’s expected payoff from forming a superfluous link to j is
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and only if its diameter is sufficiently small. More precisely, an efficient network L is stable
if and only if its diameter is weakly less than d(κw, V ), where d(κw, V ) is increasing in κw,
decreasing in V and integer valued.35
Let Le(N) be the set of efficient networks. Star networks have the smallest diameter among
networks within this set, while line networks have the largest diameter among networks within
this set. This establishes part (i) of Proposition 6.
To gain intuition for part (ii) a first step is noting that on any efficient network agents’
net payoffs are proportional to their degrees (i.e., the number of neighbours they have):36
ui(L) = |N(i;L)|(V/2 − κw). The key insight is then showing that for any network in the
set of efficient networks Le(N), the star network can be obtained by rewiring the network
(deleting a link lij ∈ L and adding a link lik 6∈ L) in such a way that at each step we increase
the degree of the agent who already has the highest degree, reduce the degree of some other
agent and obtain a new network in Le(N). This process transfers expected utility to the
agent with the highest expected payoff from some other agent, thereby increasing inequality
for any inequality measure in the Atkinson class. Likewise, we can obtain the line network
from any network in the set Le(N) by rewiring the network to decrease the degree of the
agent with the highest degree at every step. This transfers expected utility from the agent
with the highest expected payoff to some other agent, thereby decreasing inequality for any
inequality measure in the Atkinson class.
To summarize, this section identifies a novel downside to informal risk sharing agreements.
Even when investments into social capital are efficient, the networks that can be supported in
equilibrium generate social inequality, and this translates into (potentially severe) financial
inequality. The setting we have used to identify this tension between efficiency/stability
and inequality is very stylized in a number of dimensions. In the rest of the paper, we
extend our baseline model in a variety of directions to demonstrate that this basic tension
is extremely robust. First we partition agents into multiple groups and generalize the joint
income distribution (Section 5). Then, in Section 6 we show robustness to (i) simultaneously
generalizing the key assumptions in our baseline model while retaining its basic structure; and
(ii) incorporating enforcement. We also show in this section that the same tension appears
in an alternative model with imperfect risk-sharing and demonstrate a fundamental trade-off
between equality and efficiency/stability that is present extremely generally by building on
some well known graph-theory results.
5. Connections Across Groups
We now generalize our model by permitting multiple groups. These different groups might
correspond to people from different villages, different occupations, or different social status
(1− 1/2− 1/d)V . We also note that as d gets large, this converges to V/2 which is the value i receives from
forming an essential link.
35We show in the proof of Proposition 6 that d(κw, V ) = b2V/(V − 2κw)c.
36This is also known as an agent’s degree centrality.
INVESTMENTS IN SOCIAL TIES, RISK SHARING AND INEQUALITY 21
groups, such as castes. We will first show that (under our regularity condition) there is still
never any underinvestment within a group. However, this does not apply to links that bridge
groups. As, by assumption, incomes are more correlated within a group than across a group,
there can be significant benefits from establishing such links and not all these benefits accrue
to the agents forming the link. Intuitively, an agent establishing a bridging link to another
group provides other members of his group with access to a less correlated income stream,
which benefits them. As agents providing such bridging links are unable to appropriate all
the benefits these links generate, and these links are relatively costly to establish, there can
be underinvestment.
To analyze the incentives to form links within a group, we first need to consider the variance
reduction obtained by a within-group link. Such a link may now connect two otherwise
separate components consisting of arbitrary distributions of agents from different groups.
Suppose the agents in S0 ∪ · · · ∪Sk and the agents in Ŝ0 ∪ · · · ∪ Ŝk form two distinct network
components, where for every i ∈ {0, ..., k}, the agents in Si and those in Ŝi are all from group
i. Consider now a potential link lij connecting the two otherwise disconnected components.
Letting s0 be the number of agents in group 0, the variance reduction obtained is:
37















i=0 si + ŝi
)(ρw − ρa)
σ2.
The key feature of this variance reduction is that it is always weakly greater than (1−ρw)σ2,
which is the variance reduction we found in the previous section when all agents were from
the same group. Thus, the presence of across-group links only increases the incentives for
within-group links to be formed. A within-group link can now give (indirect) access to less
correlated incomes from other groups and so is weakly more valuable. This implies that there
will still be no underinvestment under our regularity condition that 2κw < V .
38 The above
reasoning is formalized by Proposition 7.
Proposition 7. There is no underinvestment between any two agents from the same group
in any stable network.
The proof of Proposition 7 is in Appendix I. While underinvestment is not possible within
group, it is possible across groups. An example of this is shown in Section E of the Sup-
plementary Appendix. Although when all agents are from the same group the value of an
37By definition



















some algebra yields the result.
38Recall that this regularity condition just requires that it is efficient for two agents in the same group, both
without any other connections, to form a link.
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essential link does not depend on the sizes of the components it connects, the value of an
essential link connecting two different groups of agents increases in the sizes of the compo-
nents. To demonstrate this formally, consider an isolated group that has no across-group
connections and consider the incentives for a first such connection to be formed. Thus the
first component consist of agents from a single group, say group 0. We let the second compo-
nent consist of agents from one or more of the other groups (1 to k). The variance reduction
obtained by connecting these two components is
(14) ∆ Var(L ∪ lij , L) =
















) (ρw − ρa)
σ2,
which is increasing in ŝ0:
(15)














)2 (ρw − ρa)σ2 > 0.
The inequality follows since ρw > ρa. Thus if agents i and j who connect two otherwise
unconnected groups they receive a strictly smaller combined private benefit than the social
value of the link. To see why, suppose that on the network L the link lij is essential, and
without lij there would be two components, the first connecting agents from group G(i)
and the second connecting agents from group G(j) 6= G(i). Consider the Myerson value
calculation. For arrival orders in which i or j is last to arrive, the value of the additional
variance reduction due to lij obtained upon the arrival of the later of i or j, is the same as
its marginal social value, i.e., the value of variance reduction obtained by lij on L. For any
other arrival order the value of variance reduction due to lij when the later of i or j arrives
is strictly less. Averaging over these arrival orders, the link lij contributes less to i and j’s
combined Myerson values than its social value, leading to the possibility of underinvestment.
Besides underinvestment, overinvestment is also possible across groups. Forming super-
fluous links will increase an agent’s share of surplus without improving overall risk sharing
and can therefore create incentives to overinvest. Nevertheless, when κa is relatively high,
underinvestment rather than overinvestment in across-group links will be the main efficiency
concern. In many settings, within-group links are relatively cheap to establish in comparison
to across-group links. For example, when the different groups correspond to different castes,
it can be quite costly to be seen interacting with members of the other caste (e.g., Srinivas
(1962), Banerjee et al. (2013b)). Motivated by this, and because across-group links are typ-
ically far sparser than within-group links, we focus our attention on this parameter region.
More concretely, below we investigate what within-group network structures create the best
incentives to form across-group links and what network structures minimize the incentives for
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overinvestment within group. Remarkably, we find that these two forces push within-group
network structures in the same direction, and in both cases towards inequality in the society.
We begin by considering within-group overinvestment, which corresponds to the formation
of superfluous links within a group. We found in the previous section that when all agents
are from the same group the star is the efficient network that minimized the incentives
for overinvestment. However, once we include links to other groups, the analysis is more
complicated. The variance reduction a within-group link generates is still 0 if the link is
superfluous, but when the link is essential it depends on the distribution of agents across
the different groups the link grants access to. Moreover, the variance reduction may be
decreasing or increasing in the numbers of people in those groups.39 This makes the Myerson
value calculation substantially more complicated. When all agents were from the same group
all that mattered was whether the link was essential when added. Now, for each arrival order
in which the link is essential, we also need to keep track of the distribution of agents across
the different groups that are being connected. Nevertheless, our earlier result generalizes to
this setting, although the argument establishing the result is more subtle.
To state the result, it is helpful to define a new network structure. A center-connected star
network is a network in which all within-group network structures are stars and all across-
group links are held by the center agents in these stars. We denote the set of center-connected
star networks by LCCS .
Proposition 8. If any efficient network L is robust to overinvestment within group, then
any center-connected star network L′ ∈ LCCS is also robust to overinvestment within group.
Moreover, if L 6∈ LCCS, then for a range of parameter specifications any center-connected
star network L′ ∈ LCCS is robust to overinvestment within group but L is not.
The proof of Proposition 8 is in Appendix I. In Proposition 6 we found that when all
agents are from the same group, incentives for overinvestment (within group) are minimized
by forming a (within-group) star. However, the incentives to form superfluous within-group
links are weakly greater when someone within the group holds an across-group link (see
equation 13). We can therefore think of the incentives for over-investment we found in
Proposition 6 as a lower bound on the minimal incentives we can hope to obtain once there
are across-group links. A key step in the proof of Proposition 8 shows that this lower bound
is obtained by all center-connected star networks.
Consider a center-connected star network L′. As the agent at the center of a within-group
star, agent k, has a link to all agents within the same group, we can focus on the incentives
of two non-center agents from the same group, i and j, to form a superfluous link. Consider
any subset of agents S ⊆ N such that i, j ∈ S. On the induced subnetwork L′(S) either lij is
superfluous or else k 6∈ S. This implies that no across-group links are present whenever the
39In the case of an essential across-group link that connects agents from just one group to agents from other
groups, the comparative statics are unambiguous. In this case, the variance reduction is increasing in the sizes
of the groups connected (see inequality (15)).
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additional link lij makes a positive marginal contribution. Hence considering different arrival
orders, the average marginal contribution of such a link when it is added is the same on the
star network with no across-group links as for a center-connected star network: The lower
bound on within-group overinvestment incentives is obtained.
We now consider the within-group network structures that maximize the incentives for an
across-group link to be formed. We have already established that the marginal contribution
of a first bridging link to the total surplus is increasing in the sizes of the groups it connects.
By the Myerson calculation, the agents with the strongest incentives to form such links are
then those who will be linked to the greatest number of other agents within their group when
they arrive. The result below formalizes this intuition.
Let A(Sk) be the set of possible arrival orders for the agents in Sk. For any arrival order
A ∈ A(S), let Ti(A) be the set of agents to whom i is path-connected on L(S′), where S′ is
the set of agents (including i) that arrive weakly before i. Let T
(m)
i be a random variable,
taking values equal to the cardinality of Ti(A), where A is selected uniformly at random from
those arrival orders in which i is the m-th agent to arrive.
We will say that agent i ∈ Sk is more Myerson central (from now on, simply more central,
for brevity) within his group than agent j ∈ Sk if T
(m)
i first-order stochastically dominates
T
(m)
j for all m ∈ {1, 2, ..., |Sk|}.
40 In other words, considering all the arrival orders in which i
is the m-th agent to arrive, and all the arrival orders in which j is the m-th agent to arrive,
the size of i’s component at i’s arrival is larger than that of j’s at j’s arrival in the sense of
first-order stochastic dominance.41 This measure of centrality provides a partial ordering of
agents.
Lemma 9. Suppose agents in S0 form a network component, and all other agents in N form
another network component. Let i, i′ ∈ S0 and let j 6∈ S0. If i is more central within group
than i′, then i receives a higher payoff from forming lij than i
′ receives from forming li′j:
MV (i;L ∪ lij)−MV (i;L) > MV (i′;L ∪ li′j)−MV (i′;L).
The proof is relegated to Appendix I. The key step in the proof pairs the arrival orders of
a more central agents with a less central agent, so that in each case the more central agent
is connected to weakly more people in the same group upon his arrival, and to the same set
of people from other groups. Such a pairing of arrival orders is possible from the definition
of centrality, and in particular the first-order stochastic dominance it requires.
Lemma 9 shows that more central agents have better incentives to form intergroup links.
We can then consider the problem of maximizing the incentives to form intergroup links by
40We also use this notion of centrality to compare the within-group centrality of the same agent on two
different network structures. To avoid repetition we do not state the slightly different definition that would
apply this situation.
41An alternative and equivalent definition is that i is more central than j if there exists a bijection B : A(Sk)→
A(Sk) such that |Ti(A)| ≥ |Tj(B(A))| and A(i) = A′(j), where A(i) is i’s position in the arrival order A and
A′ = B(P ).














Figure 4. Center-connected within-group stars, in a context with two groups.
choosing the within-group network structures (networks containing only within-group links).
We will say that the within-group network structures that achieve these maximum possible
incentives are most robust to underinvestment inefficiency across groups.
Proposition 10. If any efficient network L is robust to underinvestment across group, then
some center-connected star network L′ ∈ LCCS is also robust to underinvestment across
group. Moreover, if L 6∈ LCCS, then for a range of parameter specifications the center-
connected star network L′ ∈ LCCS is robust to underinvestment across group but L is not.
The proof of Proposition 10 is in Appendix I. Intuition can be gained from Lemma 9.
This Lemma shows that agents have better incentives to provide a bridging link across group
when they are more central within their own group. Thus to maximize the incentives of an
agent to provide an across-group link, we need to maximize the centrality of this agent within
group. This is achieved by any network that directly connects this agent to all others in the
same group. However, only one of these within-group network structures can be part of an
efficient network, and this is the star network, with the agent providing the across-group link
at the center.
Figure 4 shows a center-connected star network when there are two groups. As long as
it is efficient for these groups to be connected, center-connected star networks and only the
center-connected star networks minimize the incentives for within-group overinvestment (by
Proposition 9) and minimize the incentives for across-group underinvestment (by Proposition
10).
The above results further reinforce the tension between efficiency and equality. However,
one subtlety relative to the one group case is that while the center-connected star network
maximizes social inequality, in terms of agents’ degrees, among all efficient networks, addi-
tional assumptions are required on the parameters of the model to ensure that such networks
also maximize income inequality for all inequality measures in the Atkinson class. Taking the
link formation costs as sunk and considering only second period income, income inequality
is maximized by the center-connected-stars network (among efficient networks). However,
while the formation of the across-group link benefits the center agents, and increases their
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expected net payoffs (including link formation costs), unlike the formation of other links, it
also increases the expected net payoffs of other individuals in the group.
6. Extensions
The model we presented in the previous sections abstracts away from many potentially
relevant aspects of informal risk-sharing, such as enforcement issues or coalitional (group)
deviations. Additionally, it imposes specific functional forms on the income distribution and
utility functions, and it assumes a micro-founded, but specific, rule of sharing the surplus
generated by risk-sharing. These assumptions and modeling choices were made for analytical
tractability. In this section we demonstrate that our model can be generalized and extended
in many directions, and the main qualitative finding, that there is a tension between equality
and efficiency when incentive compatibility is required, remains intact. Our other results, on
under- and overinvestment inefficiencies, can also be extended to more general environments
than the baseline model, and we provide some results in this direction in the Supplementary
Appendix. We also limit attention in this section to homogeneous groups. Extensions of
results involving multiple groups are in the Supplementary Appendix.
6.1. More general environments and surplus sharing rules. First we examine how
the main insights from the baseline model extend when we allow for more general income
distributions, utility functions and risk sharing arrangements.
Outside the CARA-normal specification of the model expected utilities are in general
nontransferable, so we need to take a more general approach to modeling the risk-sharing
arrangements. Let vi(ci) be the utility function for agent i, mapping second period consump-
tion into utility. We assume that vi = vj = v for all i and j, and that v is strictly increasing
and strictly concave. Let P be the distribution incomes are drawn from.
Let L be the set of all possible networks for agents in N. We assume there is a unique
risk-sharing arrangement that will be implemented for any possible network L ∈ L, and that
agents correctly anticipate the risk-sharing agreement that will obtain. These risk-sharing
arrangements, which depend on the social network, might be dictated by social conventions,
or they can be outcomes of negotiation processes for transfer arrangements once the network
is formed. Let τ(L) be the transfer arrangement and uτi (L) be the expected second period
consumption utility of agent i implied by τ(L).42
We continue to assume that for every L ∈ L, τ(L) specifies a pairwise-efficient risk-sharing
arrangement τij(L) for every pair of agents i, j linked in L. As shown earlier, this is equivalent
to τ(L) being Pareto efficient at a component level. Agent i maximizes the difference between
expected utility from the second period risk sharing (given by uτi ) and her costs of establishing
links. Let Ci(L) be the set of agents on the same component as i given L.
42More precisely, utility function vi, the distribution of income realizations and transfer arrangement τ(L)
jointly determine uτi (L).
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Next we impose a series of assumptions on τ(·). We do not claim that the above assump-
tions hold universally when informal risk-sharing takes place, but they are relatively weak
requirements that are natural in many settings. Our main objective is to demonstrate that
our qualitative results hold for a much broader class of models than the CARA-normal setting
with surplus division governed by the Myerson value.
Assumption 11. (a) uτi (L ∪ {lij}) > uτi (L) for every L ∈ L, i, j ∈ N and lij /∈ L.
(b) uτk(L ∪ {lij}) ≥ uτk(L) for every L ∈ L, i, j, k ∈ N and Ci(L) 6= Cj(L).
(c) If lij /∈ L, then
uτi (L ∪ {lij})− uτi (L) = g(d(i, j, L), |Ci(L)|, |Ci(L ∪ {lij})|),
when the function g(d(i, j, L), |Ci(L)|, |Ci(L ∪ {lij})|) is increasing in the distance
measure d(i, j, L) and d : N
2 × L → R++ satisfies the following properties:
(i) If i and j are in different components on L, then d(i, j, L) = d, with d strictly
greater than the maximum possible distance between any two path-connected
agents.
(ii) d depends only on paths (thus ignoring walks with cycles).
(iii) Let Sij be the set of paths between i and j and Skl be the set of paths between
k and l. We assume d(i, j;L) > d(k, l;L) if there exists a matching function43
µ ∈ M(S, S′) such that each path between i and j is matched to a shorter path
between k and l, and all such paths between k and l are independent (do not pass
through any of the same nodes as each other).
(d) For all networks L,
cw/2 < min
L,i,j st. Ci(L)6=Cj(L)
uτi (L ∪ {lij})− uτi (L).
We maintain Assumption 11 for the rest of this subsection. Part (a) requires that estab-
lishing a link always strictly increases the connecting agents’ expected consumption utilities.
Part (b) requires that the formation of an essential link imposes no negative pecuniary exter-
nalities on other agents. Part (c) extends the idea that the private benefits two agents receive
from establishing a link should be increasing in the distance between them, while permitting
these private benefits to also depend on the sizes of the components being connected. The
notion of distance used in this assumption is relatively broad. The class of distance measures
permitted includes the Myerson distance which was found to matter in our baseline model, as
well as many others. Note that the requirement (iii) on the distance measure only provides a
weak partial ordering for the distances between agents. Part (d) requires the cost of forming
a link to be small relative to the private benefits of establishing an essential link. For general
utility functions and transfer arrangements, there is in general no guarantee that there is
43For two sets S and S′ we define M(S, S′) as the set of matching functions µ : S → S′ ∪ {∅}, such that for
s ∈ S if µ(s) 6= ∅ then µ(s) 6= µ(t) for all t ∈ S \ {s}. Thus every µ ∈M(S, S′) maps each element of S into a
different element of S′, or else the empty set.
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not underinvestment. Part (d) restricts attention to parts of the parameter space in which
underinvestment is ruled out. While this is a nontrivial assumption, it is realistic in many
settings.
A network is Pareto efficient if there is a feasible transfer agreement that could be reached
on that network such that there is no other network, feasible transfer agreement pair in which
all agents are weakly better off and some agents are strictly better off.
Proposition 12. A network is Pareto efficient if and only if it is a tree connecting all agents.
Note that for any non-essential link |Ci(L)| = |Ci(L) ∪ {lij})|. Thus the marginal benefits
from i and j forming a superfluous links depend only on the distance between i and j on L
and the number of agents in their component. The latter is n for any efficient network, by
Proposition 12. Thus, for an efficient network L by Assumption 11 part (c), the marginal
benefit i and j receive from forming a superfluous link depends only on the unique path length
between i and j, and is strictly increasing in this path length. Thus an efficient network will
be stable if and only the maximum distance between any two agents is sufficiently low. The
next Corollary formally states this result.
Corollary 13. An efficient network is stable if and only if its diameter is sufficiently small.
A network is least stable within a class of networks, when its stability implies the stability
of any other network in that class. A network is most stable within a class of networks, when
its instability implies the instability of any other network in that class.
Proposition 14. (i) The most stable efficient network is the star.
(ii) The least stable efficient network is the line.
In this generalized framework further assumptions are needed to guarantee that the star
is the least equitable and that the line is the most equitable tree network for all inequality
measures within the Atkinson class. The next proposition provides one sufficient condition,
requiring that if one efficient network can be obtained from another one by rewiring exactly
one link then only the utilities of those agents who gain or lose a link are affected.
Proposition 15. Suppose that for all pairs of efficient networks L and L′ such that L′ =
{L \ lij} ∪ ljk, the transfer arrangements satisfy τl(L) = τl(L′) for all l 6= i, k. Then for
all inequality measures in the Atkinson class, among the set of efficient networks, star net-
works and only star networks maximize inequality, while line networks and only line networks
minimize inequality.
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6.2. Enforcement through supported risk sharing and coalitional deviations. So
far we have abstracted from enforcement problems. In this section we extend the model to
capture the idea that having friends in common can reduce an agent’s incentives to renege
on an agreement. This might be because the friend in common is able to monitor actions
and identify the guilty party in a dispute, or because reneging on the agreement will lead to
a damaging reputation loss with the friend in common. While it is beyond the scope of this
paper to fully explore these issues, and there is a vibrant literature that focuses on network
based enforcement of agreements (see, for example, Jackson et al. (2012), Wolitzky (2012),
Ali and Miller (2013, 16), Ambrus et al. (2014), Nava and Piccione (2014) and Ambrus et al.
(2016)), in this Section, motivated by this literature, we model the value of friends in common
for enforcement by assuming that risk sharing between two agents is possible if, and only if,
those two agents have a friend in common. This is known as closure (Coleman, 1988) and
has long been thought important for cooperation because it enables collective sanctions to
imposed on a deviating agent—if an agent cheats on one of their neighbors, there are friends
in common that can also punish the deviating agent.
A link in L is supported and can be used for risk-sharing if, and only if, it is part of a
triangle (i.e., the complete network among three agents). Let L′ be the spanning subgraph
of L which contains only supported links. An illustrations of this is provided in Figure 5.
Risk-sharing arrangements, and rent distribution, are is as in Section 2. The only difference
is that now risk-sharing takes place on the network L′(L) instead of L (but agents continue
to pay to form links in L). As in this setting it takes more than two agents to facilitate
risk-sharing, we also require robustness of the network to the minimal coalitional deviations

























Figure 5. Panel (A) provides an example of a network among six villagers,
while panel (B) shows which of these links support risk sharing. Panel (C)
provides a different example of network among six villagers, while panel (D)
shows which of these links support risk sharing.
Before we can state our main result for this section we need some new terminology. A
network L is a tree-union of triangles if it can be expressed as the union of m (non-node-
disjoint) subnetworks ordered as {L(N1), . . . , L(Nm)}, such that ∪ki=1Ni∩Nk+1 = 1 and each
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subnetwork L(Ni) is a triangle. Thus each subnetwork in the sequence is a triangle that has
exactly one node in common with the union of all the nodes in the subnetworks preceding it
in the sequence. Panels (A) and (B) of Figure 6 illustrate two tree unions of triangles. The
tree union of triangles illustrated in Panel (A) is known the Friendship graph, or Windmill






















Figure 6. Panel (A) The shows the friendship graph connecting 9 villagers.
Panel(B) shows a different tree union of triangles connecting nine villagers.
Panel (C) shows an alternative network connecting 9 villagers in which all
villagers are also able to risk share, but all triangles share a common link.
The cost of forming a link is κ, and also as before, we continue to focus on the parameter
range for which risk sharing among all agents is always efficient. As before, the surplus
obtained from enabling risk-sharing among two groups of agents is V . Proposition 16 shows
it is efficient for all agents to risk-share if and only if V ≥ 3κ, and that the efficient networks
are then tree-unions of triangles. Thus, in comparison to Section 2 where agreements didn’t
need to be supported to be enforceable, tree unions of triangles play the role of tree networks.
Proposition 16. Suppose the number of villagers n ≥ 3 is odd.
(i) If risk-sharing among all n agents is efficient, then the efficient risk-sharing networks
are tree-unions of triangles.
(ii) Risk sharing among all n agents is efficient for all n if and only if V ≥ 3κ.
All proofs for this section are relegated to the Supplementary Appendix. To gain intuition
for this result, first observe that any link that is not supported is costly to form but cannot
be used for risk-sharing. While in principle such a link might still be valuable as a means for
supporting an agreement on another link, this requires a triangle to be formed with the link
which would make it supported. Thus in an efficient network all links must be supported,
and part of a triangle. Given this, the most efficient way to organize links (among an odd
number of agents) is to form a tree union of triangles. This creates distinct triangles in which
no link is shared by two triangles. As a comparison, note that there are 15 links formed in
the network depicted in panel (c) of Figure 6, where all risk-sharing triangles share a common
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link, while there are only 12 links in the tree union of triangles illustrated in panels (a) and
(b).
Jackson et al. (2012) find a class of networks they call social quilts to be those that
can supporting risk-sharing agreements based on renegotiation proofness. Interestingly, tree
unions of triangles are social quilts. The networks we identify through efficiency considera-
tions based on the very simple condition of support being necessary for risk-sharing, would
also be renegotiation proof in their setting. This provides further motivation for the simple
approach to enforcement we take.
We now consider the stability of the efficient risk-sharing networks. Since the need for
groups of at least three to support risk-sharing, here we require stability with respect to a
simple form of coalitional deviations for groups of three agents.44 In particular, we call a
network triple-wise stable with respect to expected utilities {ui(L)}i∈N if and only if it is
pairwise stable, and for all i, j, k ∈ N, if two or more of lij , lik, lkj are not in L and L̂ is
the union of network L with these three links, then if ui(L̂) ≥ ui(L) and uj(L̂) ≥ uj(L) with
at least one inequality strict, then uk(L̂) < uk(L). In words, triplet-wise stability requires a
network to be pairwise stable and for no set of three players to be able to benefit by forming
the links among themselves (thereby facilitating direct risk sharing among themselves).
Proposition 17.
(i) If there exists an efficient triplet-wise stable network then all friendship networks
are triplet-wise stable, and for a non-empty range of parameter specifications only
friendship networks are triplet-wise stable.
(ii) For all inequality measures in the Atkinson class, among the set of efficient triplet-wise
stable networks, friendship networks and only friendship networks maximize inequal-
ity.
This result is analogous to results in Proposition 6 in Section 4. There a star network was
the most efficient stable network, but also the most unequal. Proposition 17 shows that this
result generalizes to the case in which links must be supported to facilitate risk sharing, but
with friendship networks (tree networks of triangles, with one agent in the center being part
of every triangle) taking the place of star networks.
The basic intuition for the result mirrors the intuition for Proposition 6. Groups of three
agents have stronger incentives to deviate and form links among themselves to facilitate
risk sharing when they are further apart. Among the set of efficient networks the relevant
distances are minimized by the friendship network. In terms of inequality, it can be shown
that agents’ net payoffs are again proportional to their degrees, and the total number of
links is constant for all tree unions of triangles connecting n agents. Further, in any tree
union of triangles all agents must have at least degree 2. The friendship network therefore
minimizes the possible degree for all but one agent, while maximizing the possible degree for
44In the Supplementary Appendix, Section B, we also provide results for pairwise stability.
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the remaining agent. Analogous arguments to those in Section 4 establishing that the star
network maximizes inequality among all efficient networks for all inequality measures in the
Atkinson class can then be made to show that in the current setting the friendship network
maximizes inequality among all efficient networks for the same class of inequality measures.
6.3. Imperfect risk sharing. The benchmark model assumes that risk-sharing is perfect on
a connected component of the network. In reality, risk-sharing can be imperfect for various
reasons. In this section we briefly explore two of those reasons: because state-dependent
transfers are costly and because relationships sometimes fail to function. We demonstrate
that this can actually provide further motives for agents to form highly centralized networks.
When state-dependent transfers are costly, short paths are efficient and that requires central
agents. When relationships fail alternative paths are required and providing alternative paths
efficiently (with relatively few links) again demands central agents.
6.3.1. Costly transfers. One possible reason for imperfectness of risk-sharing is that state-
dependent bilateral transfers are costly to make (for example, income realizations might need
to be verified and this could be costly). Here we consider a very simple environment with
this feature. Assume there are n agents, with quadratic preferences45. Income realizations
are such that exactly one randomly selected agent i gets hit by a bad shock (ei = −1), one
randomly selected agent j receives a good shock (ej = −1), and all other agents are not hit by
any shock. We assume that an ex ante meeting has to take place between neighboring agents,
in order to establish risk-sharing arrangements, and that state-independent transfers can be
arranged at this point. Up to this point only network formation costs have been incurred.
Given these state independent transfers let ci(L) denote agent i’s baseline consumption level.
However, any subsequent state-dependent (post income realization) transfer requires an extra
meeting or transaction (and possibly state verification) that incurs a cost k > 0. If the cost
of forming a link κ is small enough, and k is small enough relative to κ, then any efficient
risk-sharing network has to be a tree (small κ implies that an efficient network has to be
connected, and small k relative to κ implies that duplicate links are inefficient). In this
environment it is easy to show that the constrained Pareto efficient risk-sharing arrangement
implies that for any income realization, there is a single chain of transfers corresponding to
the unique path from the agent who received a good shock, to the agent hit by a bad shock,
and everyone along this chain ends up with consumption ci− ll+1k, where l is the length of the
path (i.e., agents along the chain equally divide the costs of the l bilateral transfers required to
reach the agent with the bad shock). Given such risk-sharing agreements, the tree network
maximizing social efficiency is the one that minimizes the average distance (path length)
between two agents. The average distance is proportional to the Wiener index (the sum of
distances between different pairs of agents), and it is well-known (see for example Dobrynyn,
Entringer and Gutman (2001) p213) that the n-node star is the unique network minimizing
45This keeps expected utilities transferable given that incomes will no longer be normally distributed.
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the Wiener index among n-node trees. So when transfers are costly, there is an extra reason to
expect more centralized networks, as with a limited number of links such networks minimize
average distance between agents, and thus reduce the costs of risk-sharing. As opposed to
the benchmark model, here the star is not only the most stable efficient network structure,
but in fact the only efficient network structure.46
6.3.2. Link failures. Another potential reason for imperfect risk-sharing can be that links
might fail with some probability, making it impossible to send transfers through them, rep-
resenting a fallout between neighbors or the absence or unavailability of a neighbor for other
reasons.47 If such link failures are not uncommon, instead of tree networks efficiency requires
denser networks, with multiple paths existing between the same two agents, providing al-
ternative routes to connect them in case link failures cut some of the paths between them.
Characterizing efficient networks in such an environment analytically is a hard problem. But
Peixoto and Bornholdt (2012), in a related model, using a combination of analytical and
numerical techniques, find that for a large enough number of agents efficient networks have
a core-periphery structure, where a small core of nodes with high degree is responsible for
most of the connectivity, serving as a central backbone to the system. Such networks are
close to multi-center generalizations of the star network, in which centers are connected to
every agent, while periphery agents are only connected to the center.48
6.4. Permitting some free links. In practice relationships are formed for many reasons,
and there will be some relationships that exist for reasons unrelated to risk sharing, but
nevertheless permit risk sharing. These links might, for example, represent family relation-
ships or close friendships formed in childhood. In effect, these are relationships it is free to
form for the purpose of risk-sharing, providing another explanation for why real world risk-
sharing networks are coarser than tree networks. We extend our baseline model to permit
this possibility.
Let L̂ denote the exogenously given set of links that can be formed for free. As, by the
Myerson Value calculation, a link strictly increases the expected utility an agent receives from
the risk sharing arrangement, we assume all such links are always formed. The network L̂
will consist of a set of components. For each such component C, we identify an agent i∗(C) ∈
argmini maxjmdij(C). This is agent who has the lowest maximum Myerson Distance to any
other agent in the component C. We will refer to agent i∗(C) as the Myerson distance central
agent in component C and let Ci denote the component to which i belongs. Considering all
46Moreover, if villagers whom are more important to implementing the risk-sharing transfers (i.e., those that
are involved in more of the transfers) extract more of the surplus from risk-sharing, the star will again be
associated with the most inequality.
47For models of network formation in environments outside the risk-sharing framework with the possibility of
probabilistically failing links, see for example Bala and Goyal (2000) and Haller and Sarangi (2005).
48The efficiency of such network structures requires that link failures are exogenous and independent. If there
is a strategic adversary selecting which links fail, more decentralized networks become optimal (see Dobrynin
et al (2001) and Haller and Sarangi (2005). However, this scenario is less relevant in the risk-sharing context.
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components, we then have a set of Myerson distance central agents I∗ = (i∗(C))C . Finally,
we identify a Myerson distance central agent associated with the largest distance, i∗∗ ∈
argmaxi∗∈I∗ maxj∈Ci∗ mdi∗j .
We dub a network generated by forming all free links, and the links li∗i∗∗ for all i
∗ ∈ I∗\{i∗∗}
a central connections network. Central connections networks are always efficient.49 They are
also most stable within the class of efficient networks.
Proposition 18. Suppose there is one group. If any efficient network is stable, then all
central connections networks are also stable.
Proposition 18 shows that when some links are formed for free, the most stable efficient
network forms all additional links required for risk-sharing with a single agent. As payoffs
are proportional to degree, this again pushes villages towards inequitable outcomes.
6.5. General tensions between stability, efficiency and inequality. In this subsection
we point out a general fundamental tension between equality and efficient stable networks.
We begin by relating different graph theoretic concepts to stability, efficiency and inequality.
6.5.1. Equality. We would like to say something general about inequality for all inequality
measures in the Atkinson class on formed networks for any symmetric payoff function u :
L → R. Unfortunately, without further restrictions on how network positions translate into
payoffs, it is impossible to compare two network in general. However, it is possible to pose and
answer in general the question of when payoffs will be guaranteed to be perfectly equitable.
We proceed under the assumption that only agents’ network positions matter for their
payoffs—specifically, we require agents in identical network positions to receive the same
payoffs. Intuitively, then, if all agents are in identical positions, they must receive equal
payoffs. The set of networks for which this holds, thereby guaranteeing perfectly equitable
outcomes, will be a useful benchmark that helps identify a general tension between equality
and efficiency/stability.
In order to formalize the idea that agents are in identical network positions, we need to
introduce some graph theory notations and terminology. We limit attention to connected
networks. Every network is implicitly labelled, and we identify the set of labels with the
set of nodes N. Two networks L1 and L2 are called isomorphic, written L1 ∼I L2, if
they coincide up to labelling, i.e. a permutation of N. They are also automorphic if for
the permutation of nodes associated with the isomorphism, every node has the same set of
neighbors. More formally, the network L1 and L2 are automorphic, written L1 ∼A L2, if they
are isomorphic, and for any i, j ∈ N, i ∈ N(j;L) if and only if f(i) ∈ N(f(j);L), where f is
the relevant isomorphism mapping N1 to N2, called an automorphism. A simple undirected
binary graph L ∈ L is vertex transitive if for every pair of vertices i and j in N, there exists
49As before, the same set of risk sharing arrangements can be implemented on any given component, and
as expected utility is transferable, given that formation costs have been minimized, any point on the Pareto
frontier can be obtained.
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an automorphism fij : N→ N such that f(i) = j. Thus, when a network is vertex transitive,
we can take a node i and map it to the position of any other node j, by changing the label of
j to i, and there exists a way of relabelling the other nodes such that all nodes have exactly
the same neighbors as before and the structure of the graph is preserved. Thus the positions
of any two nodes i and j in a vertex transitive network are equivalent in a certain sense, and
it is intuitive that the agents should receive the same payoffs.
Indeed, in the Supplementary Appendix, Section D, we show that allowing for a general
payoff function, vertex transitivity is sufficient for all nodes to receive the same payoffs, and
generically, it is also necessary.
Vertex transitivity is a strong condition to place on the network structure. All vertex
transitive networks are regular, but not all regular networks are vertex transitive. So the
symmetry condition required for perfectly equitable outcomes in general is stronger than the
symmetry condition needed in our baseline model.
6.5.2. Efficiency. A network L = (n,L) is Pareto efficient if there is no network L′ such
that the payoffs of the agents on the network L′ = (n,L′) Pareto dominate those on L (i.e.,
all agents receive weakly higher net payoffs on L′ than L and at least one agent receives a
strictly higher payoff).
To get a handle on the set of Pareto efficient networks, we assume that shorter path
lengths facilitate weakly better risk-sharing. Specifically, we assume that all Pareto efficient
networks L = (n,L) have one component, and there is no alternative network L′ = (n,L′)
such that |L′| ≤ |L| and the path length distribution of L′ first order stochastically dominates
the path length distribution of L. This enables us to eliminate some configurations as being
Pareto efficient.
6.5.3. Stability. Finally, we turn to stability. Since we want to make a point at a high level of
generality, without a concrete model specification, below we propose a weak notion of stability
that can be interpreted as a necessary condition. Given the assumption we have already made
that shorter path lengths enable better risk-sharing, it is natural to also suppose that there
are stronger incentives for agents further way in the network to have a profitable deviation in
which they form a new link. This also preserves a key ingredient from our benchmark model
in terms of agents’ incentives to deviate.
We say two nodes i and j are closer on a network L than L′ if every path between i and
j on L′ can be matched to a weakly shorter path between i and j on L. We assume that
if two agents are further apart in this weak, partial ordering sense, then they have stronger
incentives to deviate and form a new link.
6.5.4. A general tension. The next result formalizes the general tension among efficiency,
stability and equality, by showing that for realistic numbers of agents a network cannot be
both efficient and regular, which as argued above is in general necessary but not sufficient
for perfectly equitable outcomes.
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Proposition 19. If in all Pareto efficient networks connecting n agents there are fewer than
n
√
n− 1/2 links, then there does not exist a constrained Pareto efficient and regular network.
To aid interpretation of Proposition 19 it is helpful to consider some values of n that are
of the same order of magnitude as village sizes. For n = 100, the optimal regular degree r
that minimizes the overall number of links is r = 10. So there are at least 500 risk-sharing
links present in a regular separation efficient network on 100 nodes (and the networks that
achieves this are 10-regular). For n = 500, the optimal regular degree r that minimizes
the overall number of links required is r = 22. So there are at least 5670 risk-sharing links
present in a Pareto efficient network on 500 nodes (and the network that achieves this is
22-regular). In both cases this is considerably more risk-sharing links than empirical research
typically documented in villages, suggesting that the minimum number of links that would
be necessary to maintain both equality and separation efficiency is inefficiently high.
To help understanding of Proposition 19 we provide an outline of the proof (see Section D
of the Supplementary Appendix for the full proof). Observe that Pareto efficient networks
must have at least n− 1 links (as we require for all nodes to be in the same component) and
a diameter of 2. This is because if there are k ≥ n − 1 links then k pairs of the nodes are
directly connected, and so the best possible path length distribution is for the other pairs
of nodes to have path lengths of two. This bound is achievable—consider any network that
includes the star on n nodes as a subnetwork. Given this, we can apply the Moore bound
from graph theory. The Moore bound says that any network component with diameter
d and maximum degree no more than ψ, the number of nodes n in the network satisfies
n ≤ 1 + ψ
∑d−1
i=0 (ψ − 1)i. Thus, for d = 2, in any regular network with degree r, there must
be n ≤ 1 + r2 nodes, or equivalently, r ≥
√
n+ 1. Hence, the total number of links in the




Our paper provides a relatively tractable model of endogenously formed networks and sur-
plus division in a context of risk sharing that allows for heterogeneity in correlations between
the incomes of pairs of agents. Such correlations have a sizeable impact on the potential of
informal risk sharing to smooth incomes. We investigate the incentives for relationships that
enable risk sharing to be formed both within a group (caste or village) and across groups, giv-
ing access to less correlated income streams. We find a novel trade-off between equality and
efficiency. Thus we identify new downsides to informal risk sharing arrangements that can
have important policy implications. This trade-off remains present in various generalizations
and extensions of our baseline model.
Although we focus our analysis on risk sharing, our conclusions regarding network forma-
tion could apply in other social contexts too, as long as the economic benefits created by the
social network are distributed similarly to the way they are in our model—a question that
requires further empirical investigation.
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Within the context of risk sharing, a natural next step would be to provide a dynamic
extension of the analysis that allows for autocorrelation between income realizations. Another
important direction in which this research agenda could be advanced is by studying dynamic
network formation problem. It is realistic to let links form sequentially, and to consider how
forward looking agents will try to manipulate this process so that they occupy advantageous
positions in the network. Interestingly, this will give rise to new forces in which agents
compete to become central, although we would also expect chance to play an important role.
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Appendix I. Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. To prove the first statement, consider villagers’ certainty-equivalent
consumption. Let K̂ be some constant, and consider the certain transfer K ′ (made in all
states of the world) that i requires to compensate him for keeping a stochastic consumption
stream ci + K̂ instead of another stochastic consumption stream c
′
i + K̂:
E[v(ci + K̂ +K
































This shows that the amount K ′ needed to compensate i for taking the stochastic consump-
tion stream ci + K̂ instead of c
′
i + K̂ is independent of K̂. As a villager’s certainty-equivalent
consumption for a lottery is independent of his consumption level, certainty-equivalent units
can be transferred among the villagers without affecting their risk preferences, and expected
utility is transferable.
Next, we characterize the set of Pareto efficient risk sharing agreements. Borch (1962) and
Wilson (1968) showed that a necessary and sufficient condition for a risk-sharing arrangement




















ci(ω)− cj(ω) = E[ci(ω)]−E[cj(ω)](18)
Letting i and j be neighbors such that j ∈ N(i), equation 18 means that when i and
j reach any Pareto-efficient risk-sharing arrangement their consumptions will differ by the
same constant in all states of the world. Moreover, by induction the same must be true for
all pairs of path-connected villagers.
Consider now the problem of splitting the incomes of a set of villagers S in each state of
the world to minimize the sum of their consumption variances:











ci(ω) for all ω.










Since Var(ci(ω) + ai) = Var(ci(ω)), the sum of variances is invariant to state-independent
changes in a consumption profile, and the variance-minimizing consumption profile exists for




i∈S E[yi]. Fix any such
profile of expected consumptions, {E[ci]}i∈S. Similarly to Wilson (1968), we apply Theorem

















By pointwise minimization with respect to ci(ω) we obtain that for each i ∈ S and almost
every ω ∈ Ω, 2(c∗i (ω) − E[ci]) = γ(ω). Thus, c∗i (ω) − c∗j (ω) = E[ci(ω)] − E[cj(ω)] for all
i, j ∈ S. Note that this equality as well implies that E[c∗i (ω)] = E[ci], and {c∗i (ω)} indeed
solves the minimization problem. Thus, the condition c∗i (ω) − c∗j (ω) = E[ci(ω)] − E[cj(ω)]
for almost all ω is exactly the same as the necessary and sufficient condition for an ex-ante
Pareto efficiency. Hence, a risk-sharing agreement is Pareto efficient if and only if the sum of
the consumption variances for all path-connected villagers is minimized.




























where τi = E[ci(ω)]−E[ 1|S|
∑
k∈S yk(ω)]. 
Proof of Lemma 4. Agent i’s net benefit from forming link lij is (MVi(L)−MVi(L \ {lij})−
κw). We need to show that
(23) MVi(L)−MVi(L \ {lij}) = MVj(L)−MVj(L \ {lij}) = md(i, j, L)V.
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Some additional notation will be helpful. Suppose agents arrive in a random order, with a
uniform distribution on all possible arrival orders. The random variable Ŝi ⊆ N identifies the
set of agents, including i, who arrive weakly before i. For each arrival order, we then have an
associate network LL(Ŝi) that describes the network formed upon i’s arrival (the subnetwork
of L induced by agents Ŝi). Let q(i, j, L) be the probability that i and j are path-connected
on network LL(Ŝi).
The certainty-equivalent value of the reduction in variance due to a link lij in a network
LL(Ŝi) is V if the link is essential and 0 otherwise. The change in i’s Myerson value, MVi(L)−
MVi(L \ {lij}), is then (q(i, j, L)− q(i, j, L \ {lij}))V . However, q(i, j, L) = 1/2. To see this,
note that lij ∈ L and therefore in every order of arrival in which i arrives after j (which
happens with probability 1/2), i and j are path-connected on the network LL(Ŝi), while i
and j are never path-connected on LL(Ŝi) when j arrives after i.
Probability q(i, j, L \ {lij}) can be computed by the inclusion-exclusion principle, using
the fact that the probability of a path connecting i and j existing on network LL\{lij}(Ŝi) is
equal to the probability that for some path connecting i and j on L \ {lij} all agents on the
path are present in Ŝi. Thus








|Pi1 ∪ · · · ∪ Pik|
) .
We therefore have that
(25) MVi(L)−MVi(L \ lij) = (1/2− q(i, j, L \ lij))V = md(i, j, L)V,
where the last equality follows from the definition of Myerson distance. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Part (i): By remark 3 and under our regularity condition, all efficient
networks are tree networks. By definition, in all tree networks any pair of agents i and j have
a unique path between them. Thus, for a tree network L with diameter d(L), there exist
agents i and j with a unique path between them of length d(L) and all other pairs of agents
have a weakly shorter path between them. Thus by equation 11:





≥ md(k, k′, L) for all k, k′ ∈ N.
By Proposition 5 there is no underinvestment in any stable network. Lemma 4 therefore
implies that the efficient network L is stable if and only if md(k, k′, L) ≤ κw/V for all k, k′
such that lkk′ 6∈ L. As md(i, j, L) ≥ md(k, k′, L) and md(i, j, L) = 1/2−1/d(L) (see equation
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As d(L) gets large, the right-hand side converges from above to 0 and so in the limit, the
condition for stability becomes V ≤ 2κw, which is violated by our regularity condition. Thus,
there exists a finite d(L) such that the efficient network L is stable if and only if d(L) ≤ d(L).
Rearranging equation 27, L is stable if and only if






So the key threshold is d(κw) = b2V/(V − 2κw)c.
Fixing the number of agents |N| in an efficient (tree) network L, the star network is the
unique (tree) network (up to a relabeling of players) that minimizes the diameter d(L) while
the line network is the unique (tree) network (up to a relabeling of players) that maximizes
the diameter d(L). The result now follows immediately.
Part (ii): On any efficient networks all links are essential and generate a net surplus
of V − 2κw > 0, where the inequality follows from our regularity condition. As i and j
must benefit equally at the margin from the link lij (see condition (ii) in the definition of
agreements that are robust to split-the-difference renegotiation), agent i’s expected payoff on
an efficient network L is
(29) ui(L) = |N(i;L)|(V/2− κw) > 0.
Thus i’s net payoff is proportional to his degree.
For any tree network L other than the star network let agent k be one of the agents with
the highest degree. Consider a link lij ∈ L such that i, j 6= k. As L is a tree there is a unique
path from i to k and a unique path length from j to k. As we are on a tree network, either
the path from j to k passes through i, or else the path from i to k passes through j. Hence
either i or j is closer to k and without loss of generality we let i have a longer path to k
than j. We now delete the link lij and replace it with the link lik. This operation generates
a new tree network. Moreover, repeating this operations until there are no links lij such that
i, j 6= k, defines an algorithm.
This algorithm terminates at star networks as the operation cannot be applied to this
network; There are no links of lij such that i, j 6= k. Moreover the operation can be applied
to any other tree network because on all other tree networks there exists an lij such that
i, j 6= k. Finally, in each step of the algorithm the degree of k increases and so the algorithm
must terminate in a finite number of steps. Moreover, the algorithm must terminates at the
star network with k at the center.
By construction, at each step of the above algorithm we decrease the degree of some agent
j 6= k and increase the degree of k. Suppose we start with a network L and consider a step of
this rewiring where the link lij is deleted and replaced by the link lik. Only the expected payoff
of agents j and k on L and L∪lik \ lij change; The degrees of all other agents remain constant
and thus by equation 29 so do their payoffs. Letting α = (V/2−κw), we have uj(L) = αdj(L),
uk(L) = αdk(L), uj(L ∪ lik \ lij) = α(dj(L)− 1) and uk(L ∪ lik \ lij) = α(dk(L) + 1).
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It follows that welfare W (u) =
∑
i f(ui) (see equation 9) decreases through the rewiring
in this step if and only if
(30) f(α(dj − 1)) + f(α(dk + 1))− f(αdj)− f(αdk) < 0,
which is equivalent to:
(31) f(α(dk + 1))− f(αdk) < f(αdj)− f(α(dj − 1))
As f(·) is increasing, strictly concave and differentiable f ′(αdj)α < f(αdj)− f(α(dj − 1))
and f ′(αdk)α > f(α(dk + 1)) − f(αdk). Moreover, by concavity f ′(αdj) ≥ f ′(αdk) (as
dk ≥ dj). Combining these inequalities establishes the claim that f(α(dk + 1)) − f(αdk) <
f(αdj)− f(α(dj − 1)).
Thus at each step of the rewiring welfare W (u) decreases. For each network L′ reached
during the algorithm we can consider the average expected utility u′(L′) which if distributed
equally would generate the same level of welfare as obtained on L. As aggregate welfare is
decreasing at each step of the rewiring u′(L) must be decreasing too. However, the total
surplus generated by risk sharing remains constant and so average expected utility u remains
constant. Recall that Atkinson’s inequality measure / index is given by I(L) = (1−(u′(L)/u).
Thus at each step of the rewiring the inequality measure I(L) increases. As this rewiring
can be used to move from any tree network to the star network, stars network and only star
networks maximize inequality among the set of tree networks, which correspond to the set
of efficient networks under our regularity condition. As this argument holds for any strictly
increasing and differentiable, concave function f it holds for all inequality measures in the
Atkinson class.
Consider now an alternative rewiring of a tree network L. Let k be one of the agents with
highest degree on L and let j be one of the agents with degree 1 on L. As tree networks
contain no cycles, there always exists agents with degree 1 (leaf agents). Pick one of k’s
neighbors i ∈ N(k;L), remove the link lik from L and add the link lij to L. This operation
generates a new tree network. Repeating this operation until the highest degree agent has
degree 2 defines an algorithm. As the unique tree network with a highest degree of 2 is the
line network, the algorithm terminates at line networks and only line networks. At each stage
of the rewiring we either reduce the degree of the highest degree agent k or reduce the number
of agents who have the highest degree. Thus the algorithm must terminate in a finite number
of steps at a line network. Moreover, reversing the argument above, inequality is reduced at
each step of the rewiring for any inequality measure in the Atkinson class. 
Proof of Proposition 7. By definition, underinvestment within group for a network L requires
that there exists an lij 6∈ L such thatG(i) = G(j) and for which TS(L∪lij)−TS(L) > 2κw. As
TS(L∪lij)−TS(L) = 0 for all non-essential links, lij must be essential on L∪{lij}. Thus lij is
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also essential on L̂∪{lij} for any L̂ ⊆ L. Equation 13 then implies that TS(L̂∪lij)−TS(L̂) ≥
V for any L̂ ⊆ L.
Consider any arrival order in which i arrives after j and let Si be the agents that arrive
(strictly) before i. Agent i’s marginal contribution to total surplus without lij when i arrives
is then TS(L(Si∪{i}))−TS(L(Si)) while with lij it is TS(L(Si∪{i})∪{lij})−TS(L(Si)). So
i’s additional marginal contribution to total surplus when lij has been formed is TS(L(Si ∪
{i}) ∪ {lij}) − TS(L(Si ∪ {i})). As L(Si ∪ {i}) ⊆ L, by the above argument TS(L(Si ∪
{i}) ∪ {lij}) − TS(L(Si ∪ {i})) ≥ V . As i arrives after j in half the arrival orders, i’s
average additional incremental contribution to total surplus when lij has been formed is
at least V/2. Thus MVi(L ∪ {lij}) −MVi(L) ≥ V/2. An equivalent argument establishes
that MVj(L ∪ {lij}) −MVj(L) ≥ V/2. Under our regularity condition V/2 > κw and so
i and j have a profitable deviation to form lij and the network L is not stable. As L was
an arbitrary network within underinvestment within group, there is no stable network with
underinvestment within group. 
Proof of Proposition 8. The proof of the first part of the statement has four steps.
Step 1: Consider any efficient network L that is robust to overinvestment inefficiency
within group. This implies that for all path-connected agents i, j such that G(i) = G(j)
and lij 6∈ L, either MVi(L ∪ {lij}) − MVi(L) ≤ κw or MVj(L ∪ {lij}) − MVj(L) ≤ κw.
However, by condition (i) in the definition of agreements that are robust to split-the-difference
renegotiation, MVi(L ∪ {lij}) −MVi(L) = MVj(L ∪ {lij}) −MVj(L) and so both MVi(L ∪
{lij})−MVi(L) ≤ κw and MVj(L ∪ {lij})−MVj(L) ≤ κw.
Step 2: Let a network L̂ := {lij : G(i) = G(j), lij ∈ L} be a network formed from L by
deleting all across-group links. Consider any subset of agents S ⊆ N such that i, j ∈ S. As
the network L is efficient, it is a tree network that minimizes the number of across-group
links conditional on a given set of agents being in a component. This implies that the unique
path between i and j cannot contain an across-group link. So, i is path-connected to j on the
induced subnetwork L(S) if and only if i is path-connected to j on the induced subnetwork
L̂(S). Thus, by equation 13, the additional variance reduction that i and j can now achieve
by forming a superfluous across-group link on L̂(S) is weakly lower than on L(S). So, by the
Myerson value definition (equation 6), MVi(L̂∪ {lij})−MVi(L̂) ≤MVi(L∪ {lij})−MVi(L)
and MVj(L̂ ∪ {lij})−MVj(L̂) ≤MVi(L ∪ {lij})−MVi(L). This implies that L̂ is robust to
overinvestment within group.
Step 3: Let a network L̂′ be a network formed from L̂ by rewiring (alternately deleting
then adding a link) each within-group network into a star (for an algorithm that does this,
see the part (ii) of the proof of Proposition 6). Consider any two agents i′, j′ such that
G(i′) = G(j′), li′j′ 6∈ L̂′. By part (i) of Proposition 6, MVi′(L̂′ ∪ {li′j′}) − MVi′(L̂′) ≤
MVi(L̂ ∪ {lij}) −MVi(L̂) and MVj′(L̂′ ∪ {li′j′}) −MVj′(L̂′) ≤ MVj(L̂ ∪ {lij}) −MVj(L̂).
Thus L̂′ is robust to overinvestment within group.
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Step 4: Finally, consider any network L′ ∈ LCSS . This network can be formed by adding
a set of across-group links to a network L̂′ such that L̂′ ⊆ L′ and if lkk′ ∈ L′ \ L̂′ then
G(k) 6= G(k′). Consider any subset of agents S′ ⊆ N such that i′, j′ ∈ S′. Recall that
G(i′) = G(j′) and note that by the construction of L′, li′j′ 6∈ L′. On the induced subnetwork
L′(S′), either i′ is path-connected to j′, in which case li′j′ would be superfluous if added,
or else i′ and j′ are isolated nodes. This is because the within-group network structure for
group G(i′) is a star. Thus, whenever li′j′ would not be superfluous, the change in i
′ and
j′’s Myerson value if it were added is independent of the across-group links that are present:
MVi′(L
′∪{li′j′})−MVi′(L′) = MVi′(L̂′∪{li′j′})−MVi′(L̂′) and MVj′(L′∪{li′j′})−MVj′(L′) ≤
MVj′(L̂
′ ∪ {li′j′})−MVj′(L̂′). Thus L′ is robust to overinvestment within group.
We turn now to the second part of the result. If L 6∈ LCCS , then there will be agents
i, j such that G(i) = G(j) and lij 6∈ L such that either the within-group network structure
for G(i) is not a star, or else it is a star but there are across-group links being held by an
agent who is not the center agent. In the first case, the inequality in step 3 will be strict
by Proposition 6. In the second case, we can without loss of generality let agent i be the
non-center agent holding the across-group link. Then, by equation 13, the inequality in step 2
will be strict. Thus for some parameter values L will not be robust to overinvestment within
group, but L′ will be. 
Proof of Lemma 9. Denote the set of all possible arrival orders for the set of agents N, by
A(N). Order this set of |N|! arrival orders in any way, denoting the kth arrival order by
Âk ∈ A(N). We will then construct an alternative ordering, in which we denote the kth
arrival order by Ãk ∈ A(N), such that for arrival order Ãk,
(i) i arrives at the same time as agent i′ does for the arrival order Âk;
(ii) when i arrives he connects to exactly the same set of agents from N \ S0 that i′
connects to upon his arrival for the arrival order Âk;
(iii) when i arrives he connects to weakly more agents from S0 that i
′ connects to upon
his arrival for the arrival order Âk.
Equation 15 shows that the risk reduction, and hence the marginal contribution made by
an agent k ∈ S0 from providing the across-group link lkj , is an increasing function of the
component size of k’s groups. It then follows that
(32) MV (i;L ∪ lij)−MV (i;L) > MV (i′;L ∪ li′j)−MV (i′;L).
To construct the alternative ordering of the set A(N) as claimed we will directly adjust
individual arrival orders, but in a way that preserves the set A(N). First, for each arrival
order, we switch the arrival positions of i′ and i. This alone is enough to ensure that conditions
(i) and (ii) are satisfied. There are |S0|! possible arrival orders for the set of agents S0.
Ignoring for now the other agents, we label these arrival orders lexicographically. First we
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order them, in ascending order, by when i arrives. Next, we order them in ascending order
by the number of agents i is connected to upon his arrival. Breaking remaining ties in any
way, we have labels 1i, 2i, . . . , |S0|!i. We then let every element of A(N) inherit these labels,
so that two arrival orders receive the same label if and only if the agents S0 arrive in the
same order. We now construct a second set of labels by doing the same exercise for i′, and
denote these labels by 1i′ , 2i′ , . . . , |S0|!i′ . We are now ready to make our final adjustment
to the arrival orders. For each original arrival order Âk we find the associated (second)
label. Suppose this is xi′ . We then take the current kth arrival order (given the previous
adjustment), and reorder (only) the agents in S0, so that the newly constructed arrival order
now has (first) label xi. Because of the lexicographic construction of the labels, the arrival
position of agent i will not change as a result of this reordering of the arrival positions of
agents in S0, so conditions (i) and (ii) are still satisfied. In addition, condition (iii) will now
be satisfied from the definition of i being more central than i′. The only remaining thing
to verify is that the set of arrival orders we are considering has not changed (i.e. that we
have, as claimed, constructed an alternative ordering of the set A(N)) and this also holds by
construction. 
Proof of Proposition 10. Let L be an efficient network that is robust to underinvestment
across group. This implies that for any across-group link lij ∈ L between groups g = G(i)
and ĝ = G(j) 6= g, MVi(L) −MVi(L \ {lij}) = MVj(L) −MVj(L \ {lij}) ≥ κa, where the
inequality follows from condition (i) in the robustness to split-the-difference renegotiations
definition.
We now rewrite L. As the network L is efficient, it is a tree network that minimizes the
number of across-group links conditional on a given set of agents being in a component. This
implies that the unique path between any two agents from the same group cannot contain
an across-group link. We can therefore rewrite the within-group network structures of L to
obtain a star by sequentially deleting and then adding within-group links (an algorithm that
does this is presented in the proof of part (ii) of Proposition 6). Do this rewiring so that agent
i is the agent at the center of the within-group network for group G(i) and let j be the agent
at the center of the within-group network for group G(j). Finally, we rewire across-group
links so that the same groups remain directly connected, but all across-group links are held
by the center agents. Let the network obtained be L′. By construction, L′ ∈ LCCS .
Under our definition of Myerson centrality, it is staightforward to verify that both i and
j are weakly more Myerson central within their respective groups on network L′ than on
network L. An argument almost identical to that in the proof of Lemma 9 then implies that
i′ and j′ have better incentives to keep the link li′j′ than i and j have to keep the link lij
(because the argument is more or less identical we skip it). Hence,
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MVi′(L)−MVi′(L \ {li′j′}) ≥MVi(L)−MVi(L \ {lij})(33)
MVj′(L)−MVj′(L \ {li′j′}) ≥MVj(L)−MVj(L \ {lij})(34)
Network L′ is therefore robust to underinvestment. Moreover, whenever the within-group
networks of i and j on network L are not both stars with i and j at the centers, the inequality
is strict because both i and j are strictly more Myerson central within-group on L′ than on
L. There then exists a range of parameter specifications for which any center-connected star
network L′ ∈ LCCS is robust to underinvestment across group but L is not. 
Supplementary Appendix: For Online Publication Only
In this supplementary appendix we provide an extended analysis that supports our main
paper “Investments in social ties, risk sharing and inequality,” henceforth referred to as the
main paper.
A. More general environments and surplus sharing rules
This section provides a slightly more general and comprehensive treatment of the issues
studied in the corresponding section of the main paper—Section 6.1. The main difference is
that here we allow for multiple groups, while in Section 6.1 attention was restricted to the
one-group case. Due to the generalization we present a complete and self-standing analysis,
even though there is much overlap with Section 6.1. We number replicated assumptions and
results so that they correspond to those in Section 6.1, and new results with the prefix SA.
The purpose of this section is to examine under what conditions our main conclusions
extend to more general utility functions, income distributions and surplus division rules.
The environment with CARA utilities and jointly normally distributed incomes facilitates
a convenient transferrable (expected) utilities environment that is particularly tractable to
analyze when social surplus is divided in accordance with the Myerson value. While analytical
tractability requires a series of strong assumptions, below we show that some of the main
qualitative insights of the model extend to much more general specifications.
For general specifications of the model expected utilities are nontransferable and the simple,
costless means of redistributing surplus via state-independent transfers we used before is no
longer available, hence we need to take a more general approach towards risk sharing. Let
vi(ci) be the utility function for agent i, mapping second period consumption into utility. We
assume that vi = vj for all i and j in the same group, and that vi is strictly increasing and
strictly concave for all i ∈ N.1 Let Pk be the distribution the incomes of agents in group
k ∈M are drawn from.
Let L be the set of all possible networks for agents in N. We assume there is a unique
risk-sharing arrangement that will be implemented for any possible network L ∈ L, and that
agents correctly anticipate the risk-sharing agreement that will obtain. These risk-sharing
arrangements, which depend on the social network, might be dictated by social conventions,
or they can be outcomes of negotiation processes for transfer arrangements once the network
is formed. Let τ(L) be the transfer arrangement and uτi (L) be the expected second period
consumption utility of agent i implied by τ(L).2
We continue to assume that for every L ∈ L, τ(L) specifies a pairwise-efficient risk-sharing
arrangement τij(L) for every pair of agents i, j linked in L. As shown earlier, this is equivalent
1These properties imply that for any number of agents more than one, and for any point of the Pareto frontier
of feasible consumption plans that can be reached via risk-sharing arrangements, there is a direction along the
Pareto frontier in which a given agent’s expected utility is strictly increasing.
2More precisely, utility function vi, the distribution of income realizations and transfer arrangement τ(L)
jointly determine uτi (L).
1
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to τ(L) being Pareto efficient at a component level. Agent i maximizes the difference between
expected utility from the second period risk sharing (given by uτi ) and her costs of establishing
links.
Let Ci(L) be the set of agents on the same component as i given L, and recall that G is a
function mapping agents in N to groups in M.
Next we impose a series of assumptions on τ(·). We do not claim that the above assump-
tions hold universally when informal risk-sharing takes place, but they are relatively weak
requirements that are natural in many settings. Our main objective is to demonstrate that
our qualitative results hold for a much broader class of models than the CARA-normal setting
with surplus division governed by the Myerson value.
The first assumption requires that establishing a link always strictly increases the connect-
ing agents’ expected consumption utilities.
Assumption 11(a). uτi (L ∪ {lij}) > uτi (L) for every L ∈ L, i, j ∈ N and lij /∈ L.
The next assumption requires that establishing an essential link does not impose a negative
externality on other agents. This implies that while both i and j privately benefit from
essential link lij , in terms of second period expected utility, they do not benefit over and
beyond the enhancement of risk-sharing opportunities that the link facilitates.
Assumption 11(b). uτk(L∪ {lij}) ≥ uτk(L) for every L ∈ L, i, j, k ∈ N and Ci(L) 6= Cj(L).
Next we extend the idea that the private benefit that two agents receive from establishing
a link should be increasing in the distance between them in the absence of the link. In
the previous analysis these private benefits depended specifically on the Myerson distance
between the two agents, while here we allow for a general class of distance measures. Before
defining the class of distance measures we allow for, some additional notation is required.
For two sets S and S′ we define M(S, S′) as the set of matching functions µ : S → S′ ∪ {∅},
such that for s ∈ S if µ(s) 6= ∅ then µ(s) 6= µ(t) for all t ∈ S \ {s}. Thus every µ ∈M(S, S′)
maps each element of S into a different element of S′, or else the empty set.
Let N
2
= {(i, j)|i, j ∈ N, i 6= j}.
Definition (Distance measure): A distance measure is a mapping d : N
2 × L → R++
satisfying the following properties:
Assumption 11(c) (i)-(iii).
(i) If i and j are in different components on L, then d(i, j, L) = d, with d strictly greater
than the maximum possible distance between any two path-connected agents.
(ii) The distance measure depends only on paths (thus ignoring walks with cycles).
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(iii) Let Sij be the set of paths between i and j and Skl be the set of paths between k and
l. We assume d(i, j;L) > d(k, l;L) if there exists a matching function µ ∈ M(S, S′)
such that each path between i and j is matched to a shorter path between k and l, and
all such paths between k and l are independent (do not pass through any of the same
nodes as each other).
Assumption 11(c) (i)-(iii) places only weak restrictions on the distance measure. In partic-
ular, part (iii) in general only provides a very weak partial ordering of the distances between
agents. However, there is a special case in which the ordering is complete. On a tree network,
there is a unique path between any two agents, so this determines the ordering of distances
between pairs of agents. In what follows, let d(·) be any distance measure satisfying the
above requirements.
While we will use the concept of distance between agents in the general case of multiple
groups, first we focus on extending our earlier results for the case of homogeneous agents.
Next we make assumptions on how distance in the absence of a link influences the private
benefits of two agents within the same group establishing that link.
The next assumption requires that if all agents are from the same group then the private
benefit two agents receive when establishing a link only depends (positively) on their distance
in the absence of the link, and on the sizes of the components they are on. Recall that in
our benchmark model in the CARA-normal setting these private benefits only depended on
the Myerson-distance between the agents. The requirement below allows the private benefit
to depend on different distance measures, and also on the sizes of the agents’ components
(which for general utilities influences the difference between the Pareto frontiers of feasible
consumption plans with and without the link).
Assumption 11(c) (Only Distance and Size Matter). If G(i) = G(j) for all i, j ∈ N and
lij /∈ L, then
uτi (L ∪ {lij})− uτi (L) = g(d(i, j, L), |Ci(L)|, |Ci(L ∪ {lij})|),
Moreover, g(d(i, j, L), |Ci(L)|, |Ci(L ∪ {lij})|) is increasing in d(i, j, L).
Note that Assumption 11(c) differs slightly from the corresponding assumption in the main
paper—now that we are permitting there to be multiple groups a qualification is made for
this assumption to only apply when all agents are in the same group. In the multiple group
case the composition of each component, in terms of the groups the constituent agents come
from, and their network positions, can matter.
The last assumption we need for recreating the results of the benchmark model for homo-
geneous agents is that the cost of link formation within a group is sufficiently small relative to
the private benefits from establishing an essential link. In the CARA-normal framework with
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the surplus allocated according to the Myerson value and all agents being homogeneous, a
pair forming an essential link received the full social surplus created by the link. This implies
that the social and private benefits coincide in the benchmark model for essential links, and
therefore there is no within group underinvestment for any cost of link formation. For gen-
eral utility functions and surplus allocation rules such equivalence does not hold, therefore
no within group underinvestment cannot be expected to hold for all possible costs of link
formation. However, for any specification of the general model that satisfies the assumptions
above (in particular that the private benefit of establishing any link is always strictly pos-
itive), there is no within group underinvestment if the cost of establishing a link between
agents from the same group is small enough. While this is a nontrivial assumption, it is
realistic in many settings. Indeed, in the data we consider, within group underinvestment
does not appear to be a problem.
Assumption 11(d) (Within Group Cost of Link-formation Small). For all networks L,
cw/2 < min
L,i,j st. Ci(L)6=Cj(L)
uτi (L ∪ {lij})− uτi (L).
Assumption 11(d) immediately implies that if all agents are from the same group then
in all stable networks there is a single component. The next proposition shows that the
same holds for all efficient networks. For the rest of the section, the above assumptions are
maintained.
A network is Pareto efficient if there is a feasible transfer agreement that could be reached
on that network such that there is no other network, feasible transfer agreement pair in which
all agents are weakly better off and some agents are strictly better off.
Proposition 12. If all agents are from the same group then a network is Pareto efficient if
and only if it is a tree connecting all agents.
Proof. First, we consider the “only if” direction. In any Pareto efficient network, every
component has to be a tree. This is because if any component was not a tree then a link
could be deleted and the same risk-sharing arrangement can be achieved as before, but the
costs of establishing the link saved. Now suppose there are two components of a Pareto
efficient network L that are not connected. Let agents i and j be on different components.
By Assumption 11(d), total expected utilities (that is, taking into account the costs of network
formation, too) of both i and j are strictly higher for network L ∪ {lij} than for network L,
while by Assumption 11(b) all other agents’ total expected utilities are weakly higher for
L ∪ {lij} than for L. This contradicts that L is Pareto efficient.
We now consider the “if” direction. Consider a tree network and suppose we implement a
risk sharing agreement in which ci(ω) = cj(ω), for all i and j and all states ω. As all agents’
consumptions are equalized in all states, there is then no way in which link formation costs
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can be redistributed and the risk sharing arrangement changed, without making someone
worse off. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that we can redistribute the link formation
costs by forming a different tree network, and find new feasible consumptions that together
constitute a Pareto improvement. Holding consumptions fixed, the change in the network
will make some agents worse off if any agents are made better off. Thus, to achieve a Pareto
improvement, consumptions will have to be changed. Let c′(ω) be the new consumption
vector. As all agents in the same group have the same utility function vi(ci) = v(ci) and as



















for all ω. Thus the average expected utility from consumption will decrease. As total link
formation costs have remained constant, this implies that at least one agent must be worse
off. This is a contradiction. 
Corollary SA1. When all agents are from the same group, there is no underinvestment.
Given Proposition 12, Corollary SA1 follows immediately from Assumption 11(d) and we
omit a proof.
Note that for any non-essential link |Ci(L)| = |Ci(L) ∪ {lij})|. Thus the marginal benefits
i and j receive from forming a superfluous link depends only on the distance between i and j
on L and the number of agents in their component. The latter is n for any efficient network,
by Proposition 12. Thus the marginal benefit i and j receive from forming a superfluous link
depends only on the distance between i and j, and is increasing in this distance. Thus an
efficient network will be stable if and only if the maximum distance between any two agents
is sufficiently low. The next Corollary formally states this result.
Corollary 14. If all agents are from the same group then an efficient network is stable if
and only if its diameter is sufficiently small.
Proof. Consider an efficient network L. As L is efficient there exists a unique path between
i and j for all i and all j 6= i. Consider two such agents i and j 6= i. Assumptions 11(c)
(i)-(iii) imply that d(i, j, L) is strictly increasing in the path length between i and j, and that
d(i, j, L) = d(j, i, L). Further, as |Ci(L)| = |Ci(L ∪ {lij})| = n, by Assumption 11(c)
uτi (L ∪ {lij})− uτi (L) = g(d(i, j, L), n, n) = g(d(j, i, L), n, n) = uτj (L ∪ {lij})− uτj (L).
Moreover, by Assumption 11(c), g(d(i, j, L), n, n) is strictly increasing in d(i, j, L). Thus
for all i and j 6= i, there exists a threshold d̂ such that i and j benefit from forming a
superfluous link if and only if d(i, j, L) > d̂.
In the absence of any underinvestment (by Corollary SA1), a network L is stable if and
only if no two agents can benefit from forming a superfluous link. As the agents’ furthest
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away from each other have the strongest incentives to form a superfluous link, L is stable if
and only if maxi,j d(i, j, L) ≤ d̂. As d(i, j, L) is strictly increasing in the (unique) path length
between i and j, this is equivalent to the diameter of L being sufficiently small. 
A network is least stable within a class of networks, when its stability implies the stability
of any other network in that class. A network is most stable within a class of networks, when
its instability implies the instability of any other network in that class.
Proposition 14. If all agents are from the same group then
(i) the most stable efficient network is the star,
(ii) the least stable efficient network is the line.
Proof. By Corollary 14 an efficient network is stable if and only if its diameter is sufficiently
low. It follows that if a network with diameter d is stable, all efficient networks with weakly
lower diameter will also be stable. As the line network maximizes diameter among efficient
networks, its stability implies the stability of all other efficient networks and it is least stable.
Similarly, if a network with diameter d is unstable, Corollary 14 implies that all network
with a weakly higher diameter are unstable. As the star network minimizes the diameter
within the class of efficient networks, its instability implies the instability of all other efficient
networks, and it is most stable within the class of efficient networks. 
Inequality measures within the Atkinson class will often rank utility vectors differently.
In the simpler setting with CARA utilities, normally distributed incomes and the Myerson
value allocation rule we were able to identify the star as the least equitable networks for any
inequality measure in the Atkinson class. This was achieved by showing that any efficient
network could be transformed into a star by rewiring it in a way such that, at each step of
the rewiring, the utility of the center agent increased, the utility of one other agent decreased
and the utility of the remaining agents remained constant. Specifically, the act of removing
a link lij and adding a link ljk, increased the utility of agent k, decreased the utility of agent
i and held constant the utility of all other agents.
In the more general setting, this rewiring need not hold constant the utility of the other
agents. This creates problems. Consider the four agent line network and suppose utilities,
after link formation costs, are (10, 25, 25, 10). Now suppose we remove link l34 and add link
l24 to create a star network. In the more general model, utilities after this rewiring might be
(11, 35, 11, 11). These two vectors will be ranked differently by different inequality measures
within the Atkinson class. However, if we make an additional assumption that this kind of
rewiring only affects those agents who gain or lose a link, then we can relate inequality to
network structure in the more general setting.
Proposition 15. Suppose there is one group, and for all pairs of efficient networks L and L′
such that L′ = {L \ lij} ∪ ljk, the transfer arrangements satisfy τl(L) = τl(L′) for all l 6= i, k.











































Figure 1. An example of the rewiring used to find a contradiction in the
proof of Lemma SA2 is shown. Panel (i) shows the initial network, Panel
(ii) the interim network and Panel (iii) the final network after the rewiring is
complete.
star networks and only star networks maximize inequality, while line networks and only line
networks minimize inequality.
Proof. We begin with a Lemma:
Lemma SA2. Suppose there is one group, and for all pairs of efficient networks L and L′
such that L′ = {L \ lij} ∪ ljk, the transfer arrangements satisfy τl(L) = τl(L′) for all l 6= i, k.
Then agents with a higher degree in L have a higher utility.
Proof. Consider an efficient network L and suppose agent i has higher degree than j. We
will show that we can rewire a network in a way that weakly reduces i’s utility and increases
j’s utility, but swaps the positions of i and j in the network such that on this new network i
should have the same utility j had on the initial network. This will imply that i must have
had a higher utility on the initial network.
Consider the following rewiring, an example of which is illustrated in Figure 1. As L is
efficient it is a tree by Proposition 12 and there is a unique path between i and j. If i is
directly connected to j we do not need to do any rewiring along this path. Otherwise, let
there be l ≥ 1 agents on this path, other than i and j, and create the following two labelings
of these agents: i, i1, . . . , il, j and i, jl, . . . , j1, j. Thus i1 = jl, i2 = j(l− 1), and so on. Now,
if agent i1 has a link to an agent k on L, and k is not on the path between i and j, we remove
the link li1,k and add the link lj1,k. Repeat until all of i1’s links to agents not on the shortest
path between i and j have been rewired. We now repeat for ik, with k = 2, . . . l. Note that
at each step of this rewiring we reach a connected tree network.
Consider now the neighbors of j not on the path between i and j. Match each of these
neighbors to a different neighbor of i’s who is also not on this path. As i has a higher degree
than j, such a matching exists. For each such pair we start with j’s neighbor. Letting this
neighbor of j be k, one by one, we rewire each of k’s links on L, except lij , to the neighbor of
i agent k was matched to. Let this agent be l. We then rewire each of l’s links on L, except
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lil, to agent k. Repeat for all of j’s neighbors on L not on the path between i and j. Note
again that at each step of this rewiring we reach a tree network. After all this rewiring, let
the network that has been reached be denoted L′.
As in all the rewiring so far i and j have kept the same links, and as at each step an
efficient network has been reached, by the premise of the Proposition, τi(L) = τi(L
′) and
τj(L) = τj(L
′), so uτi (L) = u
τ
i (L




Finally, we consider the neighbors of i who were not on the shortest path to j, and were
not matched to one of j’s neighbors. As i’s degree is higher than j’s there exists at least one
such agent. For all agents in this set, we remove their link to i and add a link to j. Let the
network reached after this be denoted L′′.





′′) and uτj (L) = u
τ
j (L
′) < uτj (L
′′). However, by construction, after this rewiring is
complete i’s position in L′′ is identical to j’s position in L (up to a relabeling of agents), while




and uτj (L) = u
τ
j (L
′′). We then have that
uτi (L) = u
τ
i (L
′) > uτi (L
′′) = uτj (L).

We can now prove the Proposition. As shown in the proof of Proposition 6(ii), the star
network can be reached from any efficient network L by rewiring links to the highest degree
agent in L. By Lemma SA2 the agent with the highest utility on L is the agent with the
highest degree, and by Assumption 11(d), the net expected utility of this agent increases
at each such step of the rewiring, while the net expected utility of all other agents weakly
decreases. The argument from the proof of Proposition 6(ii) can then be applied again, and
utilities become more unequal for any inequality measure in the Atkinson class.
The argument for the line network is equivalent. From any efficient network L, there is
a rewiring to the line network that decreases the utility of the highest degree agent at each
step, which by Lemma SA2 is also the highest utility agent, and increases the utility of all
other agents. Thus, utilities become more equal for any inequality measure in the Atkinson
class. 
We will now consider the multiple group case. With one group it was efficient for a network
to form in which all agents are path-connected to each other. We now make an assumption
to ensure this remains the case with multiple groups.
Assumption SA3 (Efficient Risk Sharing Across Group). For any network L with at least
two components there exists a risk sharing agreement τ , and a pair of agents i and j 6∈ Ci,
such that all agents are weakly better off on L ∪ {lij} and some agents are strictly better off.
Relative to the single group case, agents from different groups provide each other with
access to less correlated income streams. This increases the total surplus generated by risk
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sharing conditional on a given network being formed. Moreover, the presence of across
group links provides positive externalities to others insofar as it increases the marginal value
of within group links. This raises the question of how the additional surplus generated by
across group risk sharing should be split among the agents. We take a parsimonious approach
to this issue by making two assumptions. The first assumption builds on the single group
analysis. It requires that agents receive at least the same marginal benefits they would receive
were all agents from the same group. The additional surplus generated must be split in a
way such that each agent receives a weakly positive share.
Assumption SA4 (Lower Bound). Consider a network L, such that lij is essential on
L ∪ {lij}, and two allocations of the agents to groups G,G′. If all agents are from the same
group under G, such that G(i) = G(j) for all i 6= j, then
uτi (L ∪ {lij}, G′)− uτi (L,G′) ≥ uτi (L ∪ {lij}, G)− uτi (L,G).
This assumption requires that the additional benefits an agent i gets from risk sharing, in
terms of the second period agreement reached relative to the payoff i would have got were
everyone from the same group, strictly increase if a link ljk is removed form the network and
replaced by a link lij without changing the set of agents in each component.
Assumption SA5 (Link Increasing Additional Benefits). Consider two networks L and L′
connecting the same sets of agents, and two allocations of the agents to groups G,G′. If L′
can be reached from L by rewiring a link to i such that, L′ = {L\ ljk}∪ lij, i 6= j 6= k, lij 6∈ L,
ljk ∈ L, G′ contains agents from different groups and under G all agents are from the same
group, then
uτi (L
′, G′)− uτi (L,G′) > uτi (L′, G)− uτi (L,G).
Assumption SA5 is only a coarse partial ordering on utilities. While it implies that an
agent’s share of the additional surplus generated by across group risk sharing increases as
links are rewired to that agent, it makes no comparison between networks that cannot be
reached by rewiring links to a single agent. In particular, following a rewiring to i, it does
not pin down how the payoffs of other agents changes.
Proposition SA6. Suppose all groups have the same utility functions, such that vi = vj for
all i, j. With k different groups, there exist a κ̄W > 0 such that for all κW < κ̄W a network
is Pareto efficient if and only if it is a tree with k − 1 across group links.
Proof. We begin by showing the “only if” direction. All Pareto efficient networks are trees.
First, by Assumption SA3, risk sharing among all agents is efficient so L must connect all
agents. Second, a Pareto improvement can be achieved on any connected non-tree network
by implementing the same risk sharing arrangement and deleting a superfluous link, thereby
saving these costs.
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We now show that efficient networks must also have exactly k − 1 across group links. We
will show, by construction, that for any tree network with strictly more than k − 1 across
group links, there exists a Pareto improvement.
If there are more than k−1 across group links in a tree network, we claim that there must
exist an across-group link lij which, upon its removal, will result in a network L
′ = L \ {lij}
such that there exists two agents (k, l), with G(k) = G(l) and Ck(L
′) 6= Cl(L′).
Towards a contradiction, let there be k′ > k− 1 across group links and suppose this is not
true. As L is a tree network, removing all across group links must then result in there being
k′ + 1 components. If there are no agents from the same group in different components, this
implies that there must be at least k′+1 > k different groups, which would be a contradiction.
Thus there exist two components each containing an agent from the same group. Denote these
agents k, l. As L is a tree there exists a unique path between k and l on L, and as k and l
are in different components following the removal of across group links there exists at least
one across group link on this path. Letting this link be lij proves the claim.
As k, l are in different components on L′, but from the same group, the network L′′ = L′∪lkl
will be a connected tree network with one less across-group link, and one more within-group
link than L.
On the network L′′ we implement the same risk-sharing arrangement as before, with one
exception. First we identify the vector of consumptions for agents i and j that make them










for all states ω, ω′ and all i′ 6= k, l.
As i and j save the cost of an across group link, and utility is strictly increasing and
concave in consumption, this implies that ci(ω) and cj(ω) must strictly decreases in all states
ω. This additional consumption is passed onto agents k and l. As there is a strictly positive
amount of remaining consumption in all states of the world, and utilities are strictly increasing
in consumption, there exist feasible consumption vectors for agents k and l that strictly
increase E(v(ck)) and E(v(cl)). Thus, for all κw sufficiently small, we have E(v(ck)) > κw
and E(v(cl)) > κw. We have therefore constructed a Pareto improvement.
We now show the “if” direction. Consider a tree network with k − 1 across group links.
Suppose we implement a risk sharing agreement in which ci(ω) = cj(ω), for all i and j.
As all agents’ consumptions are equalized in all states, there is then no way in which link
formation costs can be redistributed and the risk sharing arrangement changed, without
making someone worse. Suppose towards a contradictions that we can redistribute the link
formation costs, by forming a different tree network with k−1 across group links, to generate
a Pareto improvement. Holding consumption fixed, on the new network if some agents are
better off, then some will be worse off. Thus, to achieve a Pareto improvement, consumptions
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will have to be changed. Let c′(ω) be the new consumption vector. As the utility function
















for all ω. Thus the average expected utility from consumption will decrease, and total link
formation costs have remained constant, so at least one agent must be worse off. This is a
contradiction.

In our simple CARA utility, normally distributed incomes, Myerson value allocation rule
model, underinvestment across group is possible but there is no underinvestment within
group. The same example establishes the possibility of underinvestment across group in our
more general setting. There is also never any underinvestment within group in our more
general setting as we now show.
Proposition SA7. There is never any underinvestment within group.
Proof. Consider any stable network L′ and allocation to groups G′. Suppose, towards a
contradiction, there is underinvestment within a group in L′. There must then be an essential
link lij the planner could form to achieve a Pareto improvement. Stability of L
′ implies that
either uτi (L
′∪{lij}, G′)−uτi (L′, G′) < cw or else uτj (L′∪{lij}, G′)−uτj (L′, G′) < cw. Without
loss of generality suppose uτi (L
′ ∪ {lij}, G′) − uτi (L′, G′) < cw. Consider now the alternative
grouping G in which all agents are from the same group. In this case, by Assumption 11(d)
and as lij is essential, u
τ
i (L
′ ∪ {lij}, G) − uτi (L′, G) ≥ cw. Thus, combining inequalities,
uτi (L
′ ∪ {lij}, G) − uτi (L′, G) > uτi (L′ ∪ {lij}, G′) − uτi (L′, G′). This contradicts Assumption
SA4. 
Consider the partial ordering in which an agent i is more central in a network L′ than in
network L if and only if L′ can be reached from L by rewiring links only to i. The following
result generalizes the result in the benchmark model that more centrally located agents within
a group have higher incentive to create across group links.
Proposition SA8. Suppose that
(i) when there is one group, for all efficient networks L ∪ {lij}, g(d, |Ci(L)|, |Ci(L ∪
{lij})|) = g(d, |Cj(L)|, |Cj(L ∪ {lij})|); and
(ii) there are two groups.
Then, for any efficient network L with across group link lij, if it is profitable for an agent i
to form lij, and the alternative efficient network L
′ can be reached from L by rewiring within
group links to i, then it is also profitable for i to form the link lij ∈ L′.
Proof. Let G′ be the grouping of agents. Agent i is weakly better incentivized to invest in
the across group link lij on the network L
′ than the network L if and only if
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(1) uτi (L,G
′)− uτi (L \ {lij}, G′) ≤ uτi (L′, G′)− uτi (L′ \ {lij}, G′).
As L and L′ are efficient, and lij is an across group link on both L and L
′, all agents who
are path-connected to i on L \ {lij} are from the same group as i, as are all agents path
connected to i on L′ \ {lij}. Thus, on the networks L′ \ {lij} and L \ {lij}, by Assumption
SA4 agent i must then get exactly the same payoffs as he would do in the one group case:
uτi (L \ {lij}, G′) = uτi (L \ {lij}, G) and uτi (L′ \ {lij}, G′) = uτi (L′ \ {lij}, G), where G is the
grouping in which all agents are from the same group. We can therefore rewrite equation 1
as
uτi (L,G
′)− uτi (L,G) + uτi (L,G)− uτi (L \ {lij}, G) ≤ uτi (L′, G′)− uτi (L′, G)
+uτi (L
′, G)− uτi (L′ \ {lij}, G).(2)
Repeatedly applying Assumption SA5, uτi (L,G
′)−uτi (L,G) < uτi (L′, G′)−uτi (L′, G). Thus
a sufficient condition for equation 2 to hold is that:
uτi (L,G)− uτi (L \ {lij}, G) ≤ uτi (L′, G)− uτi (L′ \ {lij}, G).
As we are in the one group case and lij is essential on both L and L
′, uτi (L,G) − uτi (L \
{lij}, G) = uτi (L′, G)− uτi (L′ \ {lij}, G) = g(d). This completes the proof.

B. Supported risk sharing
As with the previous section, this section provides a slightly more general and compre-
hensive treatment of analysis in the main paper. This time the corresponding section of the
main paper is Section 6.2. Again we number replicated assumptions and results so that they
correspond to those in Section 6.2 of the main paper, while new results are labeled with the
prefix SA.
In this section we extend the model to capture the idea that having friends in common
can reduce an agent’s incentives to renege on an agreement. This might be because the
friend in common is able to monitor actions and identify the guilty party in a dispute, or
because reneging on the agreement will lead to a damaging reputation loss with the friend
in common. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to fully explore these issues, and
there is a vibrant literature that focuses on network based enforcement of agreements (see,
for example, Jackson et al. (2012), Wolitzky (2012), Ali and Miller (2013, 16), Ambrus et
al. (2014), Nava and Piccione (2014), Ambrus et al. (2016)), in this section, motivated by
this literature, we model the value of friends in common for enforcement by assuming that
risk sharing between two agents is possible if, and only if, those two agents have a friend in
common. This is known as closure (Coleman, 1988) and has long been thought important
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for cooperation because it enables collective sanctions to imposed on a deviating agent—if
an agent cheats on one of their neighbors, there are friends in common that can also punish
the deviating agent.
A link in L is supported and can be used for risk-sharing if, and only if, it is part of a
triangle (i.e., the complete network among three agents). Let L′ be the spanning subgraph
of L which contains only supported links. An illustrations of this is provided in Figure 2.
Risk-sharing agreements, and rent distribution, are as in Section 2 of the main paper. The
only difference is that now risk-sharing takes place on the network L′(L) instead of L (but





















Figure 2. Panel (A) provides an example of a network among six villagers,
while panel (B) shows which of these links support risk sharing. Panel (C)
provides a different example of network among six villagers, while panel (D)
shows which of these links support risk sharing.
Before we can state our main result for this section we need some new terminology.
A network L is a tree-union of triangles if it can be expressed as the union of m (non-node-
disjoint) subnetworks ordered as {L(N1), . . . , L(Nm)}, such that ∪ki=1Ni∩Nk+1 = 1 and each
subnetwork L(Ni) is a triangle. Thus each subnetwork in the sequence is a triangle that has
exactly one node in common with the union of all the nodes in the subnetworks preceding it
in the sequence. Two different tree unions of triangles are illustrated in Figure 3 and panel
(A) of Figure 4, respectively. The tree union of triangles illustrated in Figure 3 is known
the Friendship graph, or Windmill network. This is the tree-unions of triangles in which all









Figure 3. The Friendship graph on 9 vertices.
We will focus on risk sharing within a village. We denote the cost of forming a link by
κ = κw. As before, we continue to focus on the parameter range for which risk sharing among
all agents is efficient. As before, the surplus obtained from enabling risk-sharing among two
groups of agents is V . Proposition 16 shows it is efficient for all agents to risk-share if and
only if V ≥ 3κ, and that the efficient networks are then tree-unions of triangles. Thus, in
comparison to Section 2 of the main paper where agreements didn’t need to be supported to
be enforceable, tree unions of triangles play the role of tree networks.
Proposition 16. Suppose the number of villagers n ≥ 3 is odd.
(i) If risk-sharing among all n agents is efficient, then the efficient risk-sharing networks
are tree-unions of triangles.
(ii) Risk sharing among all n agents is efficient for all n if and only if V ≥ 3κ.
The proof of Proposition 16 is fairly long and deferred until Section B.1. Here we offer
some intuition. First observe that any link that is not supported is costly to form but cannot
be used for risk-sharing. While in principle such a link might still be valuable as a means for
supporting an agreement on another link, this requires a triangle to be formed with the link
which would make it supported. Thus in an efficient network all links must be supported,
and part of a triangle. Given this, the most efficient way to organize links (among an odd
number of agents) is to form a tree union of triangles. This creates distinct triangles in
which no link is shared by two triangles. This might seem inefficient, but it is not because
it economizes on the number of triangles required. As a comparison consider the tree union
of triangles shown in panel (A) of Figure 4 and the alternative network, in which villagers 1
and 2 are connected to all villagers and there are no other links, shown in panel (B) of Figure
4. In the alternative network there are n− 2 = 7 triangles, while there are just (n− 1)/2 = 4
triangles in the tree union of triangles. Thus although the triangles in the alternative network
all share the link l12, meaning that for n − 3 = 6 of the triangles only two additional links
are required, there are more links in the alternative network than the tree union of triangles















Figure 4. Panel (A) shows a tree union of triangles connecting nine villagers.
Panel (B) shows an alternative network connecting 9 villagers in which all
villagers are able to risk share and all triangles share a common link.
Jackson et al. (2012) find a class of networks they call social quilts to be those that
can supporting risk-sharing agreements based on renegotiation proofness. Interestingly, tree
unions of triangles are social quilts. The networks we identify through efficiency consider-
ations based on the very simple condition of support for risk-sharing to be possible would
also be renegotiation proof in their setting. This provides further motivation for the simple
approach to enforcement we take.
We now consider the stability of the efficient risk-sharing networks. Unlike the correspond-
ing result in Section 4 of the main paper, all tree unions of triangles are equally pairwise stable
and the empty network is now always pairwise stable. As risk sharing now requires three
agents, for an agent to extricate themselves from an agreement while not leaving unsupported
links, they must delete two links at once. Thus, in addition to the pairwise stable networks,
we consider networks that are pairwise stable and also stable to multiple link deletions. Such
a network L must be pairwise stable and, for all agents i, ui(L) ≥ ui(L′) for all L′ that can
be obtained by removing any of i’s links in L.
As before, we let V be the constant value of reducing the number of risk-sharing groups
by 1.
Proposition SA9. In a tree-union of triangles, an agent i receives a net payoff |N(i;L)|(V/3−
κ). A tree-union of triangles L is pairwise stable if and only if 3V/5 ≤ 3κ ≤ 2V . A tree-
union of triangles L is pairwise stable and also stable to multiple link deletions if and only if
3V/5 ≤ 3κ ≤ V . The empty network is always pairwise stable.
The full proof is in Section B.1. Analogously to before, on efficient networks, all links
are essential and make the same expected contribution to total surplus for a random arrival
order of the agents (as can be used to calculate the Myerson value). Moreover, these benefits
are shared equally among two agents when they have a link. Collectively, a triangle of links
contributes an amount 2V to total surplus. In a tree unions of triangles each link is part
of only one triangle, and thus each link contributes on average 2V/3. As these benefits are
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split evenly among the agents forming the link, they each get V/3 while it costs each agent
κ to form a link. Hence each agent receives a net payoff of |N(i;L)|(V/3− κ), which is again
proportional to their degree.
If an agent deletes a link, exactly one other of its links becomes unsupported. Thus the
agent’s payoff decreases by 2V/3, but they only save κ in costs. Thus a network is stable to
individual link deletions if and only if 2V ≥ 3κ, while it is stable to multiple link deletions
if and only if V ≥ 3κ (which holds by the maintained assumption that it is efficient for all
agents to risk-share with each other).
Consider an agent’s incentives to form an additional superfluous link. In any network,
agents can only benefit from forming links that would be supported so that it can be used
for risk-sharing. The key to the proof is showing that on a tree union of triangles, for any
superfluous link that would be supported upon its formation, there are the same incentives
to deviate form it. Thus there is a profitable deviation to form any superfluous link in any
tree union of triangles if and only if it is profitable to form the link shown in Figure 5. As it
is profitable to form this additional link if and only if V/2 ≥ 3κ, a tree union of triangles is







Figure 5. The Friendship graph on 5 vertices with a possible deviation shown
by the dashed line.
Finally, to see that the empty network is always stable, just note that on this network
an additional link will not be supported and so not facilitate any risk sharing; thus there
are no incentives to form any link. The stability of the empty the network, and the need for
groups of at least three agents to support risk sharing, suggests that it might be reasonable to
permit coalitions of three agents to form links among themselves. We do so with the minimal
possible extension to pairwise stability that facilitates such deviations.
A network is triple-wise stable with respect to expected utilities {ui(L)}i∈N if and only if
it is pairwise stable and for all i, j, k ∈ N, if two or more of lij , lik, lkj are not in L and L̂ is
the union of network L with these three links, then if ui(L̂) ≥ ui(L) and uj(L̂) ≥ uj(L) with
at least one inequality strict, then uk(L̂) < uk(L). In words, triplet-wise stability requires a
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network to be pairwise stable and for no set of three players to be able to benefit by forming
the links among themselves (thereby facilitating direct risk sharing among themselves).
Proposition 17.
(i) If there exists an efficient triplet-wise stable network then all friendship networks are
stable, and for a non-empty range of parameter specifications only friendship networks
are stable.
(ii) For all inequality measures in the Atkinson class, among the set of triplet-wise efficient
networks, friendship networks and only friendship networks maximize inequality.
This result is analogous to results in Proposition 6 in Section 4 of the main paper. There
a star network was the most efficient stable network, but also the most unequal. Proposition
17 shows that this result generalizes to the case in which links must be supported to facilitate
risk sharing, but with friendship networks taking the place of star networks.
The proof of Proposition 17 is in section B.1. The basic intuition for the result mirrors
the intuition for the corresponding result in the main paper (Proposition 6). Groups of three
agents have stronger incentives to deviate and form links among themselves to facilitate
risk sharing when they are further apart. Among the set of efficient networks the relevant
distances are minimized by the friendship network. In terms of inequality, agents’ net payoffs
are again proportional to their degree, and the total number of links is constant in any tree
union of triangles connecting n agents. Further, in any tree union of triangles all agents
must have at least degree 2. The friendship network therefore minimizes the possible degree
for all but one agent, while maximizing the possible degree for the remaining agent. The
star network did the equivalent thing in Section 4 of the main paper, and this was the key
property of the star network that led it to generate the most inequality for any inequality
measure in the Atkinson class. The argument establishing that the friendship network now
generates the most inequality for any inequality measure in the Atkinson class is the same.
B.1. Proofs.
B.1.1. Proof of Proposition 16.
Proof. Part (i): Consider an efficient network L. As the network is efficient all agents are
then in the same risk-sharing component so L′(L) is connected. Further, as the network is
efficient every link must be supported, so L′(L) = L. This means that the network can be
decomposed into a set of triangles (where the triangles can share nodes and links with each
other and every node is part of at least one such triangle). There may be more than one such
decomposition for L. Moreover, as L′(L) = L is connected, these triangles must be connected
to each other so that there is path from every triangle to every other triangle. It is therefore
possible to order the triangles in the decomposition, so that as the triangle are added to the
network in this sequence there is always a unique component.
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Figure 6 gives an example of this triangle decomposition. In this example there is a
redundant triangle such that the original network can be constructed from a set of triangles
that excludes it. It doesn’t matter which decomposition is selected and whether the redundant













Figure 6. Panel (A) illustrates a network in which every link is supported
(i.e., L′(L) = L). Panel (B) shows how this network can be represented a
sequence of triangles. By combining the triangles 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 the original
network is obtained. The arrows in panel B indicate which links and nodes
are combined in this construction.
Consider an efficient network and an associated triangle decomposition. Suppose we create
the network associated with the decomposition. So, if there are k triangles in the decom-
position, we are then left with a network consisting of k disjoint triangles (this will require
creating duplicate nodes and links). This network has k components, 3k nodes and 3k links.
We then order these triangles, and recombine them to create the efficient network. We start
with triangle 1, add triangle 2 so that 1 and 2 now from a network component, add 3 so that
triangles 1, 2 and 3 form a component, and so on. Thus, after each step in the sequence the
number of components is reduced by one.3 We consider how the number of links and nodes
in the network must evolve along such a sequence.
When we connect an unconnected triangle to an existing set of connected triangles (which
we term the component) the ways in which this might be done can be partitioned as follows:
The new triangle can share 3 nodes with existing nodes, 2 nodes with existing nodes, or 1
node with existing nodes. In the case of sharing 3 nodes, no new nodes are being added to
the network, but new links might be. As, by construction, all nodes in the component are
already supported, it is without loss of generality to ignore such operations when searching
for minimally connected networks that enable risk sharing among all agents (i.e., efficient
networks).4 Figure 7 shows two examples of this. The addition of the triangle as shown in
3For the example given in Figure 6 the sequence 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 results in a reduction in the number of components
of one at each step, while the sequence 2, 5, 3, 1, 4 would not.
4For example, the redundant triangle in Panel A of Figure 6 could be added last in which case it would share
three nodes and three links with the component and its addition would add no new links or nodes to the
component.
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panel (A) has no effect on the number of links or nodes in the network (see panel (B)), while
the addition of the triangle as shown in panel (C) increases the number of links but not the
number of nodes in the network (see panel (D)).
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 7. Panels (A) and (B) illustrates the addition of a triangle to a risk
sharing component in which all nodes are shared by a single existing triangle.
Panels (C) and (D) illustrates the addition of a triangle to a risk sharing
component in which all nodes are shared by existing triangles.
When a triangle is added that shares two nodes, it can either share one link as well, or
share no links. When a triangle is added that shares just one node it cannot share any links.
These three possibilities are enumerated below and illustrated in Figure 8.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 8. Panels (A)-(D) illustrates the possible ways in which triangles that
share two nodes can be added, while panels (E)-(F) illustrate the possible ways
in which triangles that share one node can be added.
(a) The triangle shares two nodes, one node with each of two different triangles. In this
case, we increase the number of links in the component by 3 and increase the number
of nodes in the component by 1.
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(b) The triangle shares two nodes, both nodes with the same other triangle. In this case,
we increase the number of links in the component by 2 and increase the number of
nodes in the component by 1.
(c) The triangle shares one node. In this case, we increase the number of links in the
component by 3 and increase the number of nodes in the component by 2.
Following the decomposition, along the sequence of recombining the triangles we do one
of the above three operations at each of the k − 1 steps. There are n nodes, where (by
assumption) n is an odd integer. Suppose it is feasible to do any combination of the operations
(a) − (c), in any order to arrive at n nodes. We always start with the component being a
triangle, with three nodes and three links. This means that the number of nodes in the
original network is n = 3 + a+ b+ 2c, where a is the number of (a) operations, b the number
of (b) operations and (c) the number of c operations. As the initial network is efficient,
this sequence of operations must minimize the number of links in the resulting network,
conditional on enabling all n agents to risk-share. Assuming that any sequence of operations
is feasible, the sequence of operations must minimize 3+3a+2b+3c subject to 3+a+b+2c = n.
As n is odd, this is uniquely achieved by setting a = b = 0 and c = (n− 3)/2. (Incidentally,
when n is an even number greater than 3, it can be seen that this is instead achieved by
setting a = 0, b = 1 and c = (n − 4)/2—thus when n is even the structure of the efficient
networks is similar to the structure of efficient networks when n is odd). Note that the
efficient network is constructed through sequentially adding triangles such that at each step
in the sequence the added triangle shares exactly one node with the triangles already added.
But this is just the definition of a tree union of triangles. This implies that this sequence
of operations is feasible and that the efficient networks are tree unions—when there are n
nodes, with n odd, any tree union of triangle is efficient and no other network is efficient.
Part (ii): We have established that an efficient network is a tree union of triangles, so the
number of links under full risk sharing is 3(n − 1)/2. Since every link incurs the cost κ for
both agents, full risk sharing is therefore efficient if and only if V (n− 1) ≥ 3(n− 1)κ.

B.1.2. Proof of Proposition SA9.
Proof. Let L be a tree-union of triangles and consider one such triangle τ . Without loss of
generality label the agents in this triangle 1, 2 and 3. Consider adding the agents to the
network in an arbitrary permutation. For any such permutation, the last agent to be added
from the set {1, 2, 3} completes the triangle τ . As L is a tree union of triangles, prior to
completion of this triangle, agents 1, 2 and 3 cannot risk share with each other and must
be in different risk-sharing components of the network L′(L). Thus, the completion of the
triangle τ reduces the number of risk sharing components by 2, generating additional value
2V . So in the Myerson value calculation, the presence of the triangle τ generates an additional
expected payoff for each of the agents {1, 2, 3} equal to 2V/3 (as each is last to arrive in 1/3
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of the permutations, and so each completes τ , thereby generating risk sharing benefits of 2V ,
in 1/3 of the permutations). Thus, in a tree union of triangles an agent’s payoff before link
formation costs is |N(i;L)|V/3.
As after a link is deleted one sharing triangle is lost (as no triangles share links in a tree
union of triangles) deleting a link causes that agent to lose benefits 2V/3. Thus an agent does
not want to delete any one of their links in a tree union of triangles if and only if 2V/3 > κ.
Consider now the incentives of two unconnected agents i and j to form an additional link
lij . As i and j are unconnected they are in different risk sharing triangles. If the link lij
does not create a new triangle with some agent k, then it does not facilitate any additional
risk-sharing on any subnetwork that can be reached by adding the agents in sequentially.
Hence, agents i’s and agent j’s Myerson value is unaffected, but they pay a cost κ each to
form the link. As such deviations are unprofitable, we can restrict attention to link lij that
would be part of a triangle once added. Let τ be the triangle on L ∪ {lij} between agents
i, j and some other agent k. Thus lik ∈ L and ljk ∈ L. Upon its completion (i.e., when the
last of i, j or k is added for a given arrival order) the triangle τ facilitates new risk sharing
between agents i, j and k thereby reducing the number of risk-sharing components by 2, if
and only if both i and k and j and k were not able to risk-share with each other before. As
i and k are connected on L, and L is a tree union of triangles, they must be part of a risk
sharing triangle on L with another agent k′. Hence they are already risk-share with each
other if and only if k′ has already been added (i.e., k′ is not the last agent to be added in
the permutation among the four agents i, j, k, k′). This happens in 3/4 of the permutations.
Similarly, agents j and k must also already be part of a risk-sharing triangle with another
agent k′′ 6= k′ (were k′′ = k′ this would imply that two risk-sharing triangles in L share a link
lk′k, but then L would not be a tree union of triangles). So risk sharing among agents j and





Figure 9. Adding a new link that is supported. The new link is the dashed link.
.
The probability that the new triangle τ generates benefits 2V upon being added is 2(3!)/5!.
There are 5! permutations of i, j, k, k′, k′′. There are 3! permutations of i, j, k. For each of
these permutations, there are two permutations in which k′′ and k′ are the last two elements
for a permutation of i, j, k, k′, k′′. Hence the probability that k′′ and k′ are both after all
of i, j and k in a random permutation is 2(3!)/5! = 1/10. The probability that τ generates
benefits V is the probability that either k′ is after all of i, j and k or k′′ is after all of i, j and
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k, but k′ and k′′ are not both after all of i, j and k. The probability that k′ is after all of i, j
and k is 1/4. The probability that k′′ is after all of i, j and k is 1/4. Thus the probability that
τ generates benefits V is 1/2− 1/10 = 2/5. Thus the expected increase in surplus generated
by the link lij is 2V/5 + 2V/10 = 3V/5. These benefits accrue to agent i with probability
1/3, to agent j with probability 1/3 and to agent k with probability 1/3. Thus agent i and
j have a profitable pairwise deviation to form the link if and only if V/5 > κ. Thus a tree
union of triangles is pairwise stable if and only if 3V/5 ≤ 3κ ≤ 2V as claimed.
When it is possible to delete multiple links at once, a lower bound on the benefit lost
per link deleted in a tree union of triangles is V/3. Recall that in a tree union of triangles
an agent’s payoff before link formation costs is |N(i;L)|V/3. Thus, if after a deletion all
remaining links still facilitate risk-sharing, only V/3 will be lost per link deleted. If after the
deletion some of remaining links are not able to facilitate risk-sharing, the loss per link will be
greater. The bound of V/3 is tight. For example, if an agent simultaneously deletes all their
links this bound will be achieved. As the amount saved in link formation costs from deleting
a link is κ, it then follows that a network is pairwise stable and also stable to multiple link
deletions if and only if 3V/5 ≤ 3κ ≤ V .
Finally, note that in the empty network the incremental benefits of forming a link lij are
0 as it does not permit any risk-sharing. Hence, the empty network is pairwise stable. 
B.1.3. Proof of Proposition 17.
Proof. Part (i): By Proposition 16, efficient networks are tree-unions of triangles and by
Proposition SA9 all these networks are equally pairwise stable. Thus any difference in stability
between the efficient networks in terms of stability must be due to triplet wise deviations that
form at least two links among the three agents. Thus, there are two cases to consider—when
a triplet deviates by adding two links and when a triplet deviates by adding three links.
We consider these cases shortly. Before that, it is helpful to define a new distance measure
for tree-unions of triangles. By the definition of a tree union of triangles, any L tree union
of triangles can be decomposed into a sequence of triangles such that each triangle in the
sequence shares a single node with triangles earlier in the sequence. Thus, for any two nodes
i and j on a tree union of triangles L, there is a minimal subset of these triangles that must
be added for i and j to be path connected. We define the triangle distance between i and
j 6= i on a tree union of triangles L to be the cardinality of this set of triangles and denote
the distance by ∆(i, j;L). For example, in Figure 10 we have ∆(i, j;L) = 4, ∆(i, k;L) = 5
and ∆(k, j;L) = 1.
.
Case A (two links): For the additional links to be valuable they must create a triangle.
Thus, when the triplet adds two links, the other link must already be present. Without loss,
label this triplet i, j, k and suppose that lij ∈ L is the link in this triangle that is already





Figure 10. A tree union of triangles L
lij must be supported and there must be an agent k
′ such that lik′ ∈ L and ljk′ ∈ L. Figure
11 shows the subnetwork of L among agents i, j, k and k′, including the links that would be
formed by the deviation.
If agents i, j and k deviate to form τ , the probability that agents i and j could risk-share
without the links lik and ljk at the time τ is completed, for a random arrival order, is the
probability that agent k′ has already been added—i.e., 3/4 (the probability that k′ is not last
to arrive out of i, j, k, k′). Figure 11 shows the subnetwork of L among agents i, j, k and k′,




Figure 11. Subnetwork of a tree union of triangles L induced by agents i, j, k
and k′ is shown by the solid links. A possible triplet-wise deviation among
agents i, j and k through the creation of the links lik and ljk is shown by the
dashed links.
.
The probability that agents i and k can already risk share depends on whether there would
be a supported path between them when the triangle τ is completed. Recall that ∆(i, k;L) is
the triangle distance between i and k. Without loss, suppose that ∆(i, k;L) ≥ ∆(j, k;L). A
supported path between i and k will exist upon the completion of τ if and only if all agents
in the triangles counted in the triangle distance between i and k are already present. This
requires 1+2∆(i, k;L) agents, including i, j and k to be present when τ is completed. Letting
x = 1 + 2∆(i, k;L), the probabilty of this is the probability that i, j or k arrive last in the
arrival order among these x agents, i.e., 3(x− 1)!/x! = 3/x.
There are two possibilities to consider (given that ∆(i, k;L) ≥ ∆(j, k;L)) when calculating
the probability that agents j and k can already risk-share upon the completion of τ . First,
we could have ∆(i, k;L) = ∆(j, k;L), in which case agents j and k will be path connected
upon the completion of τ if and only if i and k are path connected upon the completion
of τ . Moreover, in this case, i and k (and thus also j and k) are path connected upon the
24
completion of τ only if the triangle (i, j, k′) is present upon the completion of τ . An example
of this case is shown in panel (A) of Figure 12. Thus the probability that the triangle τ
generates benefits 2V upon its completion is 1/4 (i.e., the probabilty k′ is last to arrive of
i, j, k and k′), and the probability it generates benefits of exactly V upon its completion is







Figure 12. Panel (A) illustrates a triplet deviation for agents i, j and k in
which the triangle distance between both agents i and k and agents j and k
is 6. Panel (B) illustrates a triplet deviation for agents i, j and k in which the
triangle distance between agents i and k is 6 and between agents j and k is 5.
The second possibility is that ∆(j, k;L) = ∆(i, k;L)− 1. An example of this case is shown
in panel (B) of Figure 12. Consider a labeling of agents consistent with lik and ljk being
the new links and lij being already present. If ∆(i, k;L) is the same for both possibilities,
then the incentives to deviate in this case are always weaker. This is because we can match
permutations such that permutation by permutation the risk-sharing value attributable to
the new links, upon completion of τ , is weakly lower now than under the first possibility.
For example, in Figure 12(a), consider any permutation in which k′ is the last agent to be
added and j is the second to last agent to be added. In this case, τ generates value 2V as
upon the addition of j none of i, j or k would be able to risk-share with each other without
the new links. Now consider the same sequence of agents for the example shown in Figure
12(b) (where, in this figure, agents j and k′ have swapped position in comparison to before).
Now, when j is added, agents k and j would be able to risk-share without the new links
because they will be still be path connected. Hence the new links only generate additional
risk-sharing benefits of V .
On any tree union of triangles L there are at least two leaf triangles (such that two of the
agents in the triangle have degree 2). Thus, if the maximal triangle distance between any two
nodes on L is z, there is a pair of connected nodes i, j whom are both triangle distance z from
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some other node k. Hence, for the triplet of agents with the strongest incentives to deviate
by forming two links on any tree union of triangles L, the triangle distance between the
agents without links will be equal to the maximum triangle distance in the network. Thus,
the maximum incentives over all triplets in a tree union of triangles L, for them deviate by
forming two links, is increasing in the maximum triangle distance on the network which we
call the triangle diameter. For example, for the tree unions of triangles shown in Figure 12
the triangle diameter is 6 and for the deviation shown in panel (A) the triangle distance
between agent i and k and between agents j and k are equal to 6. The friendship network
has a triangle diameter of 2, which is strictly lower than for any other tree union of triangles
that is not a friendship network. The incentives for some triplet to deviate on a tree union
of triangles is therefore strictly lower on a friendship network than any other tree union of
triangles.
Case B (three links): Again the additional links must create a triangle and facilitate risk
sharing among the agents. Without loss, label these agents i, j and k and the triangle they
create from their deviation τ . For the three links to be added, these agents must all initially
be in different risk-sharing triangles. Moreover, as L is a tree union of triangles, there is a
unique set of risk-sharing triangles among any two of them that connects them. Let X be the
set of agents in the risk-sharing triangles connecting i and k, let Y be the set of agents in the
risk-sharing triangles connecting j and k, and let Z be the set of agents in the risk-sharing
triangles connecting i and j.
The triangle τ , upon its completion for a random arrival order, permits new risk sharing
among the triplet generating value 2V if and only if none of the following conditions hold:
(i) agent i or k is the last to arrive among the agents in the set X; (ii) agent j or k is the
last to arrive among the agents in the set Y ; (iii) agent i or j is the last to arrive among
the agents in the set Z. This is a complex (although tractable) combinatorial calculation to
write down. However, for our purposes, what matters are the following two facts: (a) this
probability increases as additional agents are added to any of the sets X, Y or Z (whether
these agents are present in the other sets or not); (b) this probability increases as the sets
X,Y and Z become less overlapping holding their individual cardinalities fixed. For example,
holding the sets Y and Z fixed, and the cardinality of X fixed, if |X ∪Y | or |X ∪Z| increases
the probability increases.
The triangle τ , upon its completion, permits new risk sharing among the triplet generating
value V or 2V if and only if at most one of the following conditions hold: (i) agent i or k
is the last to arrive among the agents in the set X; (ii) agent j or k is the last to arrive
among the agents in the set Y ; (iii) agent i or j is the last to arrive among the agents in the
set Z. Again, for our purposes, what matters is the following two facts: (a) this probability
increases as additional agents are added to any of the sets X, Y or Z (whether these agents
are present in the other sets or not); (b) this probability increases as the sets X,Y and Z
become less overlapping holding their individual cardinalities fixed.
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As i, j and k are in different risk sharing triangles on L (and no triangles in a tree union
of triangles share a link), we have the following inequalities on cardinalities:
(1) |X|, |Y |, |Z| ≥ 5,
(2) |X ∪ Y |, X ∪ Z|, |Y ∪ Z| ≥ 7,
(3) |X ∪ Y ∪ Z| ≥ 7.
For any given tree union of triangles, when considering the stability of it with respect to
these deviations, we are interested in the triplet of agents that has the strongest incentives
to deviate. These incentives are again minimized in the friendship graph. The friendship
graph achieves the aforementioned bounds for any triplet of agents that can deviate in this
way. Moreover, it is straight-forward to see that for any other tree-union of triangles, the
bounds are not achieved—there must exist two agents with a tree distance greater than 2,
and without loss these agents can be labeled i and k such that |X| ≥ 7.
Part (ii): By Proposition SA9 the payoff of each agent is proportional to its degree.
Among tree unions of triangles the friendship graph maximizes the degree of the highest
degree agent and set the degree of all remaining agents to 2. As all agents in all tree unions
of triangles must have degree of at least 2 the argument used in the proof of Proposition 6(ii)
in the main paper goes through unchanged.

C. Permitting some free links
This section replicates and then extends Section 6.4 in the main paper.
In practice relationships are formed for many reasons, and there will be some relation-
ships that exist for reasons unrelated to risk sharing, but nevertheless permit risk sharing.
These links might, for example, represent family relationships or close friendships formed in
childhood. In effect, these are relationships it is free to form for the purpose of risk-sharing,
providing another explanation for why real world risk-sharing networks are coarser than tree
networks. We extend our baseline model to permit this possibility.
Let L̂ denote the exogenously given set of links that can be formed for free. As, by the
Myerson Value calculation, a link strictly increases the expected utility an agent receives in
a risk sharing arrangement, we assume all such links are always formed. The network L̂ will
consist of a set of components, each of which contains agents from the same group. For each
such component C, we identify an agent i∗(C) ∈ argmini maxjmdij(C). This is agent who
has the lowest maximum Myerson Distance to any other agent in the component C. We
will refer to agent i∗(C) as the Myerson distance central agent in component C and let Ci
denote the component to which i belongs. Considering all components, we then have a set
of Myerson distance central agents I∗ = (i∗(C))C . Finally, we identify a Myerson distance
central agent associated with the largest distance, i∗∗ ∈ argmaxi∗∈I∗ maxj∈Ci∗ mdi∗j .
We dub a network generated by forming all free links, and the links li∗i∗∗ for all i
∗ 6=
i∗∗ a central connections network. Suppose there are k different groups and k′ ≥ k initial
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components. The set of efficient network then comprises of the set of networks in which all
free links are formed and k′ − k within group links are formed (i.e., the minimal number of
costly links that must be formed for there to be a single component).5 Central connections
networks are always efficient. They are also most stable within the class of efficient networks.
Proposition 18. Suppose there is one group. If any efficient network is stable, then all
central connections networks are also stable.
Proposition 18 shows that when some within-group are formed for free, the most stable
efficient network forms all additional links required for risk-sharing with a single agent. As
payoffs are proportional to degree, this again pushes villages towards inequitable outcomes.
We now prove Proposition 18.
Proof. Consider two components C and C ′. For two agents i, j in component C, recall that
md(i, j, C) equals 1/2 less the probability that a path exists between i and j on C upon the
arrival of i. Suppose now we take two components C and C ′. Let agents i, k be in component
C and agents j, k′ be in component C ′, and form the bridging link lkk′ . The probability a
path exists between i and j upon i’s arrival is now is equal to the probability that a path
exists between i and k on C multiplied by the probability that a path exists between k′ and
j on C ′. This is because these events are independent, and when both path exist agents k
and k′ must have arrived before i and so the link lkk′ must be present. It follows that
argmax
i,j
mdij(C ∪ C ′ ∪ {lkk′}) = {i, j : i ∈ argmax
l




Thus the network generated by forming all free links, and the links li∗i∗∗ for all i
∗ 6= i∗∗
minimizes the maximum Myerson distance on an efficient network and, by Lemma 4, is
stable if any other efficient network is stable. 
When there are multiple groups, central connections networks within group with the agent
i∗∗ providing the across group link(s) continue to work well. With multiple groups, agents’
incentives to form superfluous within-group links depend on two things. First, as before,
whether the link will be essential for a random arrival order, and second, unlike before,
how many agents from other groups the link provides access to upon i’s arrival when it is
essential. Incentives to form a superfluous within-group links are increasing in the number of
agents from other groups the link provides access to, and decreasing in the number of agents
within-group the link provides access to. These considerations make superfluous links to the
agent providing the across group link(s) particularly valuable. However, by construction the
network generated by forming a central connections network within-group, with the agent i∗∗
providing the across group link(s), minimizes the maximum probability that a superfluous
link to the agent providing the across group link(s) will be essential for a random arrival
5As before, the same set of risk sharing arrangements can be implemented on any given component, and as
expected utility is transferable, given that formation costs have been minimized, any point on the Pareto
frontier can be obtained.
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order. It thus minimizes the maximum incentives for an agent to form a superfluous link
within-group to the agent providing the across group link(s).
Considering the incentives within a group to efficiently form an across-group essential
link, a central connections networks within-group is also likely to do well. By Lemma 9
more Myerson central agents have better incentives to form across group links. While central
connections networks maximize a slightly different notion of the centrality of the most central
agent, in this case agent i∗∗, these measures of centrality are likely to be highly correlated.
We therefore expect central connections networks within-group to provide relatively good
incentives for across group links to be formed.
D. General tensions between stability, efficiency and inequality
Like earlier sections, here we provide a more detailed treatment of a corresponding Section
in the main paper. The corresponding section this time is Section 6.5.
The purpose of this section is to document a general fundamental tension between equality
and efficient stable networks. We begin by relating different graph theoretic concepts to
stability, efficiency and inequality.
D.0.1. Equality. We would like to say something general about inequality for all inequality
measures in the Atkinson class on formed networks for any symmetric payoff function u :
L → R. Unfortunately, without further restrictions on how network positions translate into
payoffs, it is impossible to compare two network in general. However, it is possible to pose and
answer in general the question of when payoffs will be guaranteed to be perfectly equitable.
We proceed under the assumption that only agents’ network positions matter for their
payoffs—specifically, we require agents in identical network positions to receive the same
payoffs. Intuitively, then, if all agents are in identical positions, they must receive equal
payoffs. The set of networks for which this holds, thereby guaranteeing perfectly equitable
outcomes, will be a useful benchmark that helps identify a general tension between equality
and efficiency/stability.
In order to formalize the idea that agents are in identical network positions, we need to
introduce some graph theory notations and terminology. We limit attention to connected
networks. Every network is implicitly labelled, and we identify the set of labels with the
set of nodes N. Two networks L1 and L2 are called isomorphic, written L1 ∼I L2, if
they coincide up to labelling, i.e. a permutation of N. They are also automorphic if for
the permutation of nodes associated with the isomorphism, every node has the same set of
neighbors. More formally, the network L1 and L2 are automorphic, written L1 ∼A L2, if they
are isomorphic, and for any i, j ∈ N, i ∈ N(j;L) if and only if f(i) ∈ N(f(j);L), where f is
the relevant isomorphism mapping N1 to N2, called an automorphism. A simple undirected
binary graph L ∈ L is vertex transitive if for every pair of vertices i and j in N, there exists
an automorphism fij : N→ N such that f(i) = j. Thus, when a network is vertex transitive,
we can take a node i and map it to the position of any other node j, by changing the label of
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j to i, and there exists a way of relabelling the other nodes such that all nodes have exactly
the same neighbors as before and the structure of the graph is preserved. Thus the positions
of any two nodes i and j in a vertex transitive network are equivalent in a certain sense, and
it is intuitive that the agents should receive the same payoffs.
To formalize the idea that vertex transitivity is the key network symmetry condition for
equal payoffs we show that for a large class of payoff functions mapping network positions into
payoffs, payoffs are identical if and only if the network is vertex transitive. In principle, an
agent’s payoff can depend not only on their position in a network L, but also their position in
subnetworks of L. Moreover, we might want to assign different subnetwork values to agents
in the same subnetwork that vary with different orderings of the agents, and in particular,
some notion of the marginal effect an agent has on the subnetwork. This gives us a rich basis
for considering network payoffs.
Define T as the ordered set of permutations over the nodes N. Note that with regards
to any node i ∈ N, every permutation τ ∈ T maps one-to-one onto two specific induced
subgraphs: one, the subgraph supported by vertices up to and excluding i, and two, the
subgraph supported by vertices up to and including i. Let ν : T ×V×L → R be the function
which assigns to every pair {τ, i} a “marginal value” with regards to such implied pairs of
subgraphs in L. Let Siτ ⊆ L denote the induced subgraph supported by those vertices up to
and including i in τ , while S−iτ = S
i
τ \ {i} is the node-deleted subgraph of Siτ with regards
to i. We require νi(τk) = νj(τ`) if the respective subgraphs including, respectively, i and
j are isomorphic (Siτk ∼I S
j
τ`) and the respective subgraphs excluding, respectively, i and
j are isomorphic (S−iτk ∼I S
−j
τl ). This confines node identity only to matter in so far as it
corresponds to a position in a subnetwork. Let Vi : Rn! → R be the function which maps node
i’s multi-set of n! marginal values {νi(τ)}T in L onto a “graph value”, where n! is simply the
cardinality of T . So the overall payoff we assign to an agent depends on all their possible
marginal values. We restrict how these marginal values are mapped into payoffs by requiring
only anonymity, i.e. any pre-image under Vi is closed under permutation. Hereafter, we let
νi and Vi indicate the conditioning on some node i when convenient.
Let V denote the space of admissible functions Vi, and F denote the space of admissible
functions νi. We will say that a result applies generically if it applies to all but a zero measure
set of admissible functions νi and all but a zero measure set of admissible functions Vi. Of
course, many non-generic mappings (Vi, νi) may be of interest. That non-withstanding it is
of interest to study what network symmetry is needed in general for agents to receive equal
payoffs.
We proceed to pin down the simple graphs for which expected payoffs Vi must be uniform
for any payoff mapping (including the Myerson value).
Proposition SA10. Vi = Vj for all i, j ∈ N if L is vertex transitive and, generically, Vi =
Vj for all i, j ∈ N only if L is vertex transitive.
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Proof. Sufficiency. Consider any two vertices i and j as well as some permutation τ . Let
f(τ) ∈ T be the image of τ under the automorphism mapping i to j, which exists by the vertex
transitivity of L. As automorphisms by definition preserve adjacency relations, Sjτ ∼I Sf(i)f(τ)
and S−jτ ∼I S−f(i)f(τ) for all i, j ∈ V. Hence, νj(τ) = νi(f(τ)) by the earlier requirement of
identity in ν under isomorphism of the implied graph arguments, for any τ ∈ T . Fix the
set of all of i’s marginal values in L, written {νi}T , in arbitrary order. By the foregoing
argument, there exists a bijection between {νi}T and {νj}T through f . By anonymity of V ,
hence V ({νj}T ) = V ({νi}f◦T ) = V ({νi}T ).
Necessity. We start with a well known result from graph theory. A simple undirected
binary graph of finite order is vertex transitive if, and only if, its one-node deleted subgraphs
are isomorphic (Thomassen, 1985). Thus if we have a graph that is not vertex transitive
there exist nodes i and j such that L\{i} 6∼I L\{j}. Hence generically, for any permutation
τ in which i is last, and any permutation τ ′ in which j is last, νi(τ) 6= νj(τ). So generically,
V ({νi}T ) 6= V ({νj}T ). 
Proposition SA10 shows that for a large space of payoff functions for which all that matters
is agents’ network positions, vertex transitivity guarantees equal payoffs and is also required
for equal payoffs, generically. A non-generic payoff function in this space, that can be applied
in the special case of transferable utilities (which is not assumed for the above result) is the
Myerson value. As we have seen, vertex transitivity is sufficient but not necessary for equal
payoffs under the Myerson value. With the Myerson value the weaker symmetry requirement
of regular networks (so that each node has the same number of neighbors) is sufficient (see
Section 4 of the main paper).
Proposition SA10 takes its informational basis for determining payoffs to be similar to that
used by the Myerson value. However, this informational basis is very broad and any way of
determining payoffs based on coarser information is covered by the result. For example, the
result covers any payoff function that depends only on each agent’s set of friends (neighbors),
set of friends of friends, set of friends of friends of friends, and so on, for every possible
subnetwork of L. As a more specific example, if payoffs were proportional to each agent’s
eigenvector centrality they would depend only on the structure of the network L, and so
by Proposition SA10 agents would receive identical payoffs on a vertex transitive network.6
Similarly, if payoffs were proportional to agents’ marginal contributions to the spectral radius
of the network L, then they would depend only on the structure of the network L and the
subnetworks L \ {i} for all i ∈ N , and so, by Proposition SA10 agents’ payoffs would be
identical on a vertex transitive network.
D.0.2. Efficiency. A network L is Pareto efficient if there is no network L′ such that the
payoffs of the agents on the network L′ Pareto dominate those on L (i.e., all agents receive
6As one of many ways in which this can be implemented, set νi(τ) equal to i’s eigenvector centrality on L for
all τ in which i is last to arrive, and to 0 otherwise, and let Vi equal maxτ∈T νi(τ).
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weakly higher net payoffs on L′ than L and at least one agent receives a strictly higher
payoff).
To get a handle on the set of Pareto efficient networks, we assume that shorter path
lengths facilitate weakly better risk-sharing. Specifically, we assume that all Pareto efficient
networks G = (n,L) have one component, and there is no alternative network G′ = (n,L′)
such that |L′| ≤ |L| and the path length distribution of L′ first order stochastically dominates
the path length distribution of L. This enables us to eliminate some configurations from the
set of networks that might be Pareto efficient.
D.0.3. Stability. Finally, we turn to stability. Since we want to make a point at a high level of
generality, without a concrete model specification, below we propose a weak notion of stability
that can be interpreted as a necessary condition. Given the assumption we have already made
that shorter path lengths enable better risk-sharing, it is natural to also suppose that there
are stronger incentives for agents further way in the network to have a profitable deviation in
which they form a new link. This also preserves a key ingredient from our benchmark model
in terms of agents’ incentives to deviate.
We say two nodes i and j are closer on a network L than L′ if every path between i and
j on L′ can be matched to a weakly shorter path between i and j on L. We assume that
if two agents are further apart in this weak, partial ordering sense, then they have stronger
incentives to deviate and form a new link.
D.0.4. A general tension. The next result formalizes the general tension among efficiency,
stability and equality, by showing that for realistic numbers of agents a network cannot be
both efficient and regular, which as argued above is in general necessary but not sufficient
for perfectly equitable outcomes.
Proposition 19. If in all Pareto efficient networks connecting n agents there are fewer than
n
√
n− 1/2 links, then there does not exist a constrained Pareto efficient and regular network.
To aid interpretation of Proposition 19 it is helpful to consider some values of n that are
of the same order of magnitude as village sizes. For n = 100, the optimal regular degree r
that minimizes the overall number of links is r = 10. So there are at least 500 risk-sharing
links present in a regular separation efficient network on 100 nodes (and the networks that
achieves this are 10-regular). For n = 500, the optimal regular degree r that minimizes
the overall number of links required is r = 22. So there are at least 5670 risk-sharing links
present in a Pareto efficient network on 500 nodes (and the network that achieves this is
22-regular). In both cases this is considerably more risk-sharing links than empirical research
typically documented in villages, suggesting that the minimum number of links that would
be necessary to maintain both equality and separation efficiency is inefficiently high.
We now prove Proposition 19
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Proof. Consider a network L = (n,L). Nodes i and j have a path length of 1 if and only
if lij ∈ L. Thus, the number of pairs of nodes with path length 1 in network L is |L|. In
a network with n nodes there are n(n − 1)/2 potential links. Thus a lower bound on the
distribution of path lengths a network L = (n,L) can achieve (in terms of first order stochastic
dominance) is for |L| pairs of nodes to have path length 1 and the remaining n(n−1)/2−|L|
pairs of nodes to have path length 2. Moreover, this bound is tight. Any network which
contains the star network as a subnetwork trivially achieves the bound.
By assumption, on a Pareto efficient network L, all nodes are path-connected and there
must be no alternative network L′ = (N,L′) that contains weakly fewer links and generates
a path length distribution that first order-stochastically dominates L. Thus all efficient
networks must have |L| pairs of nodes with path length 1 and n(n − 1)− |L| pairs of nodes
with path length 2 (otherwise the star network would contain weakly fewer links and generate
a path length distribution that first order-stochastically dominates L). Hence all Pareto
efficient networks on L must have diameter 2.
In a regular network of order r, each node has r neighbors. A given node i then has r
neighbors, and each of these have r − 1 neighbors other than i. Were there any other nodes
in the graph, the diameter would be more than 2. Hence, an upper bound on the number of
nodes in the network is n̄ := 1+r+r(r−1) = r2 +1. Indeed, this is exactly the upper bound
on the number of nodes in a regular network given by the Moore upper bound for diameter 2
networks. As n ≤ n̄, we can rearrange the inequality to conclude that r ≥
√
n− 1 (as r > 0).
The number of links in an r regular network is nr/2—there are n nodes each with r links,




E. Overinvestment and Underinvestment Examples
In this Section we provide an example of over-investment within group in the unique stable
network and a related example of underinvestment across group in the unique stable network.
We begin by assuming there is one group with s members connected by a network L.
Equation 11 in the main paper implies that Myerson distance of two agents i, j such that
lij 6∈ L is greater than 1/2, while the Myerson distanace between i and j if they form the link
lij would be 1/2. Thus i and j’s gross payoff strictly increases if the link lij is added. So, for
κw sufficiently close to 0, in all stable networks for any pair of agents i, j the link lij must be
formed; The unique stable network is the complete network and there is overinvestment.
Suppose now there are two groups, g, g′ both with s members and keep the same parameter
values from the previous example. By equation 13 in the main paper, the incentives to form
within group links are weakly increased by the presence of any across group links. Thus
in all stable networks the network structure within-group must be complete networks; All
possible within-group links must be formed. Suppose these are the only links formed so that
no across-group links are formed. Denote this network L. From equation 13 the change in
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total variance achieved by connecting an agent i from group g to an agent j from group g′ is
strictly increasing in s (the size of both groups). Given the Myerson value calculation, this
means that the marginal contribution of the link lij to total surplus (the certainty equivalent
value of the variance reduction) is strictly greater on L∪{lij} than it is on any strict subgraph,
including all those formed when the later of i and j arrives in the Myerson calculation. This
implies that (MV (i;L∪ lij)−MV (i;L))+(MV (j;L∪ lij)−MV (j;L)) < TS(L∪ lij)−TS(L)
for all lij : i ∈ Sg, j ∈ Sg′ . So, setting κa such that
MV (i;L ∪ lij)−MV (i;L) +MV (j;L ∪ lij)−MV (j;L) < 2κa < TS(L ∪ lij)− TS(L),
the network L is the unique stable network and there is underinvestment (in across-group
links) in all stable networks.
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